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[1] As the United States’ national pastime, baseball has taught valuable
lessons to generations of Americans. For example, players often learn
how to be good teammates, how to set goals, and how to exercise
discipline. Baseball has other important life lessons to share as well such
as the value of “chemistry.” Chemistry is that intangible quality that
allows individual players, each with a differing skill set and personal
agenda, to work together and propel the team forward. It is what makes a
team, a team.
[2] Consider the following situation. The best player on the team, the
shortstop, has been injured. The only player currently on the bench is lefthanded. What are the coach’s options? The first option involves the
coach making the changes necessary to move the players to their “logical”
positions. For example, the coach could move the third baseman, the
team’s second best fielder, to the shortstop position. He could then move
his able-bodied first baseman to third base, a position with which he has
some experience. Finally, he could put the left-handed player at first base,
a position suitable for left-handed players. This series of “logical”
changes to the defensive line-up has filled the void of shortstop. Because
*
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the coach avoided the potentially awkward placement of a left-handed
player at shortstop, the first option seems like a good choice. Then there is
the second option, in which the coach could simply allow the left-handed
player to fill the void at shortstop.
[3] Although both options accomplish the task of replacing the injured
shortstop, is one option better than the other? Which option should the
coach choose? Most baseball aficionados instantly recognize that a lefthanded player at shortstop is an awkward fit. For example, the throw
across the diamond is more difficult for a left-handed player than it is for a
right-handed player, and it is more difficult for a left-handed player to
protect the middle of the field. The first option prevents this awkwardness
while the second option embraces it. At first glance, the first option
appears to be the best choice.
[4] However, for others – those who have studied the game of baseball –
the second option is the preferred choice. Why? It is the option that
provides the greatest number of players with an opportunity to be
successful. As a coach, you must consider the role of each player on the
field and how those players interact with one another. While the coach
might be able to substitute the skill set of the injured shortstop, he is
unlikely to replicate the injured shortstop’s comfort level. His feel for the
game. His experience. For example, he is familiar with that part of the
field and can predict how the players in his immediate vicinity will react
to certain conditions. He is accustomed to watching the batter from that
position. He knows where he is supposed to be on any given play and
understands the expectations and demands of his position. He has made
the plays before. Armed with this knowledge, experience, and a sense of
comfort, a player has the greatest chance for success. Now, which option
should the coach chose?
[5] In many ways, Congress is the coach of Team Patent. Congress must
ensure that the attorneys, inventors, agents, and examiners that comprise
Team Patent have the best opportunity to succeed. Under the current
“first-to-invent” patent system, each player knows the rules of the game.
Each player knows how to prepare for the game and what to expect from
his teammates. The players are comfortable in their respective roles. Like
any other team, Team Patent will perform well on some days and stumble
on others. Nevertheless, this team is successful. Any massive change to
2
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the team’s infrastructure jeopardizes the team’s likelihood of success. The
threat to the team’s chemistry – that intangible quality that distinguishes
the good from the great – intensifies.
[6] Congress is under increasing pressure to reform the rules of the game
by which Team Patent plays. These changes to the rules have been
described as “the most sweeping reforms to this country’s patent laws in at
least 50 years.”1 Like any good coach, Congress must take the course of
action that least disturbs Team Patent’s game. The comfort level of Team
Patent cannot be jeopardized because doing so diminishes the likelihood
of its success. Too many deviations from what Team Patent expects from
the game will yield a box score of trouble.
PART I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
[7] The primary purpose of the American patent system is to advance the
arts and sciences.2 During the 1941 hearings of the Temporary National
Economic Committee,3 the Commissioner of Patents summarized the
system by stating that “[t]he individual reward is only the lure to bring
about this much broader objective. Every patent granted benefits society
by adding to the sum total of human knowledge . . . .”4 In this regard, the
United States distinguishes itself from all other nations with its unique
adherence to the first-to-invent patent system.

1

Steven B. Kelber, Bill Has Issues All Will Debate, NAT’L L.J. Aug. 29, 2005.
Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchem. Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945).
3
Alfred W. Knight, The Patent System, 6 ALUMNI REV. 16 (1943). At President
Roosevelt’s suggestion, Congress established the Temporary National Economic Meeting
(“TNEC”) in 1938. The President recommended a thorough investigation of the
“concentration of economic power in American industry and the effect of that
concentration upon the decline of competition.” The TNEC hearings were diverse,
covering subjects ranging from monopolies to patents to advanced technology. The
hearings generated forty-three volumes of published reports. The final report was
published in 1941 and was swiftly followed by the American entry into World War II; an
event that was far more significant than any other factor in finally bringing the Great
Depression to an end.
4
Sinclair, 325 U.S. at 331 (quoting Commissioner Coe’s testimony before the TNEC
hearings).
2
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[8] The first-to-invent and the first-to-file patent systems represent two
different ideologies for determining which inventor is entitled to a patent
when multiple applicants claim the same subject matter. According to the
first-to-invent system, the inventor who establishes that he made the
invention in this country before another, and did not abandon, suppress, or
conceal it, will acquire superior rights over all later inventors.5 The named
inventors in subsequently filed applications receive nothing. This “all-ornothing” approach raises the concern that patents may “grant[] property
rights beyond what inventors legally deserve, or (of more fundamental
concern) beyond what best promotes the development and dissemination
of technological products.”6
[9] Conversely, the first-to-file system rewards the filing of an application
over inventorship. Priority is determined by the first application filed with
the patent office rather than by the first individual to conceive of the
invention.7 First-to-file systems often recognize the rights of prior users
by awarding compulsory licenses to those applicants who were practicing
or developing the same claimed invention but were not the first applicant
to file.8
[10] In recent years, the pressure to overhaul the American patent system
has increased. The number of proposed reforms is extensive. Among the
5

35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002).
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (g)(1) during the course
of an interference conducted under section 135 or section 291, another
inventor involved therein establishes, to the extent permitted in section
104, that before such person’s invention thereof the invention was
made by such other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed, or (2) before such person’s invention thereof, the invention
was made in this country by another inventor who had not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention under
this subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates
of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the
reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce
to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
6
John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural
Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 105 (2001).
7
Gary L. Griswold & F. Andrew Ubel, Prior User Rights – A Necessary Part of a Firstto-File System, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 567, 569-70 (1993).
8
Id. at 570-71.
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most controversial of these proposed reforms is the abandonment of the
current first-to-invent system in favor of the widely adopted first-to-file
system. As explained by one scholar, the impetus for these proposed
changes arises because “[t]he first-inventor system works too slowly, at
too great a cost, with too much complexity, and with too many
uncertainties to serve best the needs of a technologically advanced
nation.”9 The drive for global patent harmonization is gaining momentum
as Congress continues to amend American patent laws to conform to
international treaties and standards. However, its unique adherence to the
first-to-invent system prevents the United States’ participation in certain
global discussions.
[11] The American first-to-invent patent system traces its roots directly to
the Constitution of the United States.10 Notwithstanding the current
system’s flaws, the United States continues to “dominate[] the rest of the
world in innovation, to the point that in almost every field of industry
today the technology is based largely on inventions which originated in
the United States.”11 Although each patent system has its advantages and
disadvantages, abandoning the first-to-invent system in favor of the firstto-file system will decrease the quality of patents and increase the costs of
patent litigation. Of greater importance, it will violate the Constitution.
The uncertainties associated with the adoption of a first-to-file system in
the United States are numerous and unsettling.
[12] This paper rejects the adoption of the first-to-file system. Patent
reform should only proceed bit-by-bit. Hence, this paper encourages
Congress to slowly and incrementally implement any necessary reforms.
The abandonment of the first-to-invent system in favor of the first-to-file
system is not prudent and should therefore be considered only as a last
resort. Part II of this paper introduces the reader to the origins of the
9

The Patent Harmonization Act of 1992: J. Hearings on H.R. 4978 and S.2605 Before
the S. Judiciary Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the H. Judiciary
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration, 102d Cong. (1992)
(statement of Robert A. Armitage, Vice President, Corporate Patents and Trademarks,
The Upjohn Company, on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers)
[hereinafter Patent Harmonization Act of 1992 Hearings].
10
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
11
Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent: A Superior System for the United States, 22 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 779, 779-80 (1991).
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American patent system, from its roots in the English Statute of
Monopolies to its codification in the Constitution. Part III discusses the
current American first-to-invent patent system. Part IV familiarizes the
reader with the proposed first-to-file system. Part V details both the
domestic and international calls for reform of the American first-to-invent
system. Part VI argues against the adoption of the first-to-file system.
Part VII addresses suggestions for potential reform and Part VIII
concludes the paper.
PART II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM
[13] Although the Constitution formally established the American patent
system, the system’s roots reach back for centuries and across the Atlantic
Ocean.12 When determining whether to provide constitutional authority
enabling Congress to grant patent monopolies, the framers of the
Constitution considered three available sources of precedent.13 The most
familiar of these sources, and therefore the most important, was the
existing patent practice in England.14 Even before the reign of Queen
Elizabeth I, the English Crown had granted monopolies.15 Such a
monopoly granted to its holder the right to exclude others from
manufacturing the item or practicing the invention.16 Furthermore, it
conferred to the applicant the right to engage in those activities.17 Queen
Elizabeth’s eventual abuse of the system, including her capricious
conveyance of these exclusive rights, precipitated strong judicial and

12

See generally, Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States
Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697 (1994).
13
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 10 (1994). These three precedents were: 1) the
existing patent practice in Great Britain; 2) the colonial practice of granting “patents”;
and 3) the patent-granting practices of various states during the Confederacy.
14
Id.
15
Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1119, 1143 (2000).
16
Id.
17
Id.
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statutory actions against monopolies.18 In its 1601 session, which has
been described as “the most significant in English constitutional history,”
Parliament commenced a struggle to overcome Queen Elizabeth’s royal
prerogative.19 Although Queen Elizabeth staved off a statutory prohibition
against granting such monopolies,20 she was not as successful in
controlling the will of the judiciary.21
[14] English courts generally believed that monopolies were illegal.
Monopolies were detrimental to “the liberty of the subject” because they
raised prices, reduced the availability of goods, and reduced competition.22
The judiciary solidified its position in Darcy v. Allein.23 In Darcy, the
court voided a monopoly issued to a groom of the Queen's Privy Chamber
for manufacturing playing cards.24 The court’s prohibition of monopolies,
however, was not absolute. The Darcy court carved out an exception for
those situations in which an individual “by his own charge and industry, or
by his own wit or invention doth bring any new trade into the realm.” 25 In
those circumstances, an individual might usefully be granted a monopoly.
[15] Many scholars believe that the Statute of Monopolies was the legal
foundation for the English patent system.26 Twenty years after the Darcy
decision, the Statute of Monopolies codified the general prohibition
against monopolies. Like the Darcy court, the statute also created an
exception by granting patents for “new manufactures within this realm, to

18

Id. See also Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent
Law: Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 853-54 (1994).
19
Id. at 865.
20
Id. Walterscheid further noted that Queen Elizabeth hoped her subjects would not take
away her royal prerogative, which she held as “the chiefest flower in her garden and
principal and head pearl in her crown and diadem.”
21
Id. at 867.
22
Id. at 868.
23
Darcy v. Allein, (1620) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.) reprinted in MONOPOLY AND
COMPETITION POLICY VOL. I, at 5-11 (F.M. Scherer ed., Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.,
1993).
24
Id.
25
Walterscheid, supra note 18, at 869.
26
Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 12.
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the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures . . . .”27
Several aspects of English patent practice were noteworthy.28 First, the
grant of a patent was an exception to the Statute of Monopolies, an
exception driven by an interest in public service. Second, the Crown
exercised complete discretion over the English patent practice, i.e., it was
a royal prerogative.29 As such, these patent rights were protected by
English common law notwithstanding the lack of a common law right to a
patent. Third, a patent monopoly enjoyed increasing importance as
English industrial development expanded.30
[16] After the hostilities with Great Britain subsided, Americans renewed
their interests in protecting intellectual property.31 On May 2, 1783, “[t]he
earliest known venture of the United States Government into the realm of
intellectual property” occurred when the Continental Congress issued a
resolution encouraging the states to enact laws protecting copyright.32 In
27

Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
[A]ny declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any letters
patents and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years or under,
hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner of
new manufactures within this realm, to the true and first inventor and
inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of making
such letters patent and grants shall not use, so as also they be not
contrary to the law nor mischievous to the state . . . the same fourteen
years to be accounted from the date of the first letters patents or grant
of such privilege hereafter to be made, but that the same shall be of
such force as they should be if this act had never been made, and of
none other. Id.
28
Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 13.
29
WILLIAM M. HINDMARCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATIVE TO PATENT PRIVILEGES
FOR THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS 3 (1846) (explaining that “inventors are never entitled
as of right to letters patent, granting them the sole use of their inventions, but they must
obtain them from the Crown by petition, and as a matter of grace and favour . . . .”)
(emphasis in original).
30
Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 14.
31
Id. at 17.
32
Id. at 20. The resolution stated:
That it be recommended to the several states, to secure to the authors or
publishers of any new books not hitherto printed, being citizens of the
United States, and to their . . . executors, administrators and assigns, the
copyright of such books for a certain time, not less than fourteen years
from the first publication; and to secure to the said authors, if they shall
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1784, South Carolina responded to this recommendation by enacting a
copyright law.33 This law, however, failed to provide the administrative
procedures required for its successful implementation.34 Eleven other
states enacted general copyright laws between 1783 and 1786,35 but not
one state attempted to enact a general patent statute.36 The lack of a
general patent statute likely reflected the absence of mention by the
Continental Congress in its May 1783 resolution.37 Notwithstanding the
lack of federal Congressional encouragement, the states independently
attempted to provide inventors with some exclusive rights of limited
duration.38 However, by early 1787, the defects in this individualistic
state-driven approach to patent protection were evident. Most notably,
because a state could only legislate within its geographical boundaries, it
could only protect patent rights within its borders.39 There was a lack of
uniformity in the protection of intellectual property. To prevent
infringement in neighboring states under this fragmented approach, a
patent holder was forced to secure patents in multiple states,40 which was a
difficult and expensive process. Additionally, as states occasionally
revoked a previously issued patent, a patent was not an absolute guarantee

survive the term first mentioned, and to their . . . executors,
administrators and assigns, the copyright of such books for another
term of time not less than fourteen years, such copy or exclusive right
of printing, publishing and vending the same, to be secured to the
original authors, or publishers, or . . . their executors, administrators
and assigns, by such laws and under restrictions as to the several states
may seem proper. Id. n.63 (omissions in original).
33
Id. at 16.
34
See BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 93
(1967) (noting that the grant of each patent required a special act by the legislature).
35
Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 21.
36
See generally BUGBEE, supra note 34, at 110-22. Six of these enactments occurred in
1783, with three states – Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Maryland – actually preceding
the congressional resolution. Only Delaware failed to comply with the congressional
recommendation. Scholars presume that lack of a similar attempt to provide patent
protection likely reflected the absence of mention by the Continental Congress’ May
1783 resolution.
37
Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 20.
38
Id. at 22.
39
Id.
40
See id. Each patent granted required its own independent legislative act.
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of protection.41 As one observer of the time concluded, “a patent can be of
no use unless it is from Congress, and not from them till they are vested
with much more authority than they possess at this time.”42
[17] When the Constitutional Convention convened in May of 1787, only
one document of record referenced the subject matter that ultimately
comprised Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution (the
Intellectual Property Clause).43 Apparently, the states did not instruct their
delegates to seek patent (or copyright) protection in the evolving
Constitution.44 The closest expression of concern for protection of
intellectual property surfaced in April of 1787, when Virginia delegate
James Madison noted that among the weaknesses of the existing
Confederation was a “want of concert in matters [between state
governments] where common interest requires it.”45 But compared to the
deplorable loss of “national dignity, interest, and revenue,” Madison
considered “want of uniformity in the laws concerning naturalization &
literary property” to be “[i]nstances of inferior moment.”46
[18] Evidence of debate or discussion regarding the Intellectual Property
Clause at the Constitutional Convention is lacking as not one delegate to
the Constitutional Convention left any record concerning the interpretation
or meaning placed on the intellectual property clause.47 Nevertheless,
Thomas Jefferson captured the overwhelming sentiment of the time. He
41

See Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812) (discussing how on
March 19, 1787, New York granted a patent to steamboat inventor John Fitch for
exclusive use of steamboats on all waterways in that jurisdiction, and that more than
eleven years later, New York revoked Fitch’s patent and awarded it to Robert R.
Livingstone for twenty years).
42
BUGBEE, supra note 34, at 90 (quoting Letter from F. W. Geyer to Silas Deane (May
1, 1787)).
43
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries”).
44
Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 24.
45
BUGBEE, supra note 34, at 125 (noting that James Madison “unburdened himself on
paper” regarding the weaknesses of the Confederation by a cataloging list of its defects).
46
Id.
47
See Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Framers
Include It With Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 361 (1992).
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noted that “monopolies [] are justly classed among the greatest nuisances
in Government . . . [because] [m]onopolies are sacrifices of the many to
the few. Where the power is in the few, it is natural for them to sacrifice
the many to their own partialities and corruptions.”48 Virginian George
Mason echoed Jefferson’s sentiments. Mason refused to sign the proposed
Constitution because he believed that an earlier draft gave Congress the
power to “grant monopolies in trade and commerce.”49
[19] Despite this general opposition to monopolies, the framers knew that
patents were different. Yes, patents were technically monopolies, but they
were of a more favorable and beneficial variety.50 To ensure that patent
rights were granted to inventors for a limited time, the framers chose to
expressly grant this power to Congress.51 Unlike any other constitutional
grant of Congressional power, the Intellectual Property Clause provides an
explicit statement of the framers’ legislative intent – “to promote the
progress of science and useful arts.”52
[20] This explicit statement of legislative intent led to speculation as to
the statement’s purpose. One scholar suggested, “this power of Congress
was enumerated . . . for the purpose of expressing its limitations.”53
Others believed the Intellectual Property Clause forced Congress to
exercise this enumerated power in a very particular way.54 Two findings
support the latter assertion. First, the framers rejected other attempts to
grant Congress similar special powers.55 Second, by the time the
48

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 1 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES at 427
(William C. Rives & Philip R. Fendall eds., 1884) (1865).
49
See Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 55.
50
Id. at 38.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 32-33.
53
1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 486 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1978) (1953). Crosskey suggests
that “[r]eading the power, then, in light of the [S]tatute of Anne and the then recent
decisions of the English courts, it is clear that this power of Congress was enumerated in
the Constitution, for the purpose of expressing its limitations.” (emphasis in original).
54
Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 33.
55
Id.
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Constitutional Convention began, the colonists had utilized a variety of
means, other than the grant of a patent, to promote scientific and artistic
progress.56
[21] When the discussion of enumerated congressional powers began on
August 16, 1787, the draft Constitution did not refer to inventors, patents,
authors, or copyrights.57 However, just a short time later, the power “[t]o
encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful
knowledge and discoveries; [t]o grant patents for useful inventions” was
among twenty additional powers “proposed to be vested in the Legislature
of the United States . . . .”58 Although the identity of the delegate who
introduced this proposed power is unknown, James Madison and Charles
Pinckney are the likely candidates.59 On August 18, 1787, both men
submitted proposals to the Committee on Detail.60 Although the
committee then issued a partial report on August 22, 1787, it said nothing
Jefferson's dinner conversation of March 11, 1798 supports this
observation: Baldwin mentions at table the following fact. When the
bank bill was under discussion in the House of Representatives, Judge
Wilson came in, and was standing by Baldwin. Baldwin reminded him
of the following fact which passed in the grand convention. Among the
enumerated powers given to Congress, was one to erect corporations. It
was, on debate, struck out. Several particular powers were then
proposed. Among others, Robert Morris proposed to give Congress a
power to establish a national bank . . . . This was rejected, as was every
other special power, except that of giving copyrights to authors, and
patents to inventors; the general power of incorporating being whittled
down to this shred. Wilson agreed to the fact.
Id. n.107 (emphasis in original) (quoting 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 375-76 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)).
56
Id. at 33 n.108. By the time the Constitutional Convention convened, the other types
of rewards included but were not limited to awarding medals, honorary titles, premiums,
and bounties.
57
Id. at 44.
58
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 321-22 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
59
See Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 50. Walterscheid suggested that “Madison’s
subsequent defense of the Intellectual Property Clause, while not conclusive, suggests
that he had more than a passing interest in this particular clause.” (citing THE FEDERALIST
NO. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961) (“The utility of this
power will scarcely be questioned.”)). Id. n.172.
60
Id. at 50.
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about intellectual property.61 Shortly thereafter, the Committee of Eleven
unanimously adopted the Intellectual Property Clause in its current form.62
The lack of recorded debate or discussion regarding the Intellectual
Property Clause has prompted some scholars to surmise that the framers
attempted only “to clarify, [rather] than to change, the existing law.”63
[22] Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution reads,
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”64 In addition to imposing specific
limitations on subject matter, scope, and duration, the Intellectual Property
Clause provides Congress with its legislative intent.65 Because “[e]very
patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the public,” the
framers restricted the congressional grant of patent monopolies to
circumstances in which progress of science and the useful arts could be
promoted.66 “Patents serve a higher end– the advancement of science. An
invention need not be [ ] startling . . . [b]ut [ ] has to be of such quality and
distinction that masters of the scientific field . . . will recognize it as an
advance.”67
61

Id.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 508-10 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911). The vote occurred on September 5, 1787. It was called the Committee of Eleven
because Rhode Island never sent any delegates to the Convention and New York could
not vote because its delegation was absent. Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 50.
63
CROSSKEY, supra note 53, at 477. The clause was adopted on September 5, 1787 after
several months of intense and sometimes nasty debate on other issues. However,
according to Madison’s notes, the delegates approved the Intellectual Property Clause
with neither discussion nor debate. While many commentators believe that the lack of
discussion regarding the clause signified universal agreement among the delegates
regarding its purpose, others argue for an alternate interpretation. In short, the delegates
may have been too tired after such an exhausting summer to engage in a critical dialogue
regarding the clause. See also Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 26-27.
64
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
65
Walterscheid, supra note 13, at 31-32.
66
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermkt. Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
67
Id. at 155. In Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883), Justice Bradley discussed
the ramifications of a more lenient standard.
“It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every
trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would
62
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PART III. THE CURRENT AMERICAN FIRST-TO-INVENT PATENT SYSTEM
[23] When the Philippines adopted the first-to-file system on January 1,
1998, the United States became the only country utilizing the first-toinvent patent system.68 The American patent system is unique in that it
embraces conception as the touchstone of inventorship.69 “The conception
of the invention consists in the complete performance of the mental part of
the inventive act . . . [i]t is [ ] the formation, in the mind of the inventor, of
a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention . . .
..”70 In the American patent system, four factors determine the priority of
invention: 1) the place of invention, 2) the date of conception, 3) the date
of reduction to practice, and 4) the diligence of the inventor from the date
of conception to the date of reduction to practice.71

naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator
in the ordinary progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate
creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to
stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who
make it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement,
and gather its foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable
them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without
contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts. It
embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and
apprehensions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits
and vexatious accountings for profits made in good faith.”
68
Perspective on Patents: Harmonization and Other Matters Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4
(2005) (statement of Gerald Mossinghoff, Former Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks).
69
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
see also Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1897) (holding that
conception requires the “complete performance of the mental part of the inventive act”).
70
Mergenthaler, 11 App. D.C. at 276 (emphasis in original).
71
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002). Previously, a party seeking to prove a date of invention
could not introduce evidence of inventive activity occurring in a foreign country.
Following the implementation of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPs”) Agreement, 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2002) was amended to permit
introduction of evidence of inventive activity occurring in any WTO member country.
The amendment applied to all applications filed in the United States on or after January 1,
1996. See 35 U.S.C. § 104 (2002).
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[24] Because the formation of the complete idea is the core of the creative
act,72 the filing of a patent application is not solely determinative of one’s
right to obtain a patent. Professor Ned Conley explains the American firstto-invent patent system as follows:
Under our first-to-invent system, the inventor can be told
that if he diligently proceeds to reduce his invention to
practice he need not rush to file a patent application.
Instead, he can wait until his invention is fully developed
and he has determined that it will perform satisfactorily,
thereby improving his chances for obtaining financing. He
can also be told that delaying filing until the invention is
fully developed will allow him to more fully describe his
invention, thereby improving his chances of obtaining a
patent which will protect commercially viable variations of
his invention.73
Because the first to-invent priority system rewards innovation, an
inventor can make a choice and still find protection.74 A poorly financed
inventor may choose to delay filing an application until the invention is
fully developed.75 Under the current system, making this choice does not
pose a significant risk of losing the exclusive right to the American
patent.76 A more solvent inventor may choose to file provisional
applications in this and other countries.77 As the invention matures, the
inventor can file subsequent applications. Most importantly, the inventor
can be confident that the inventor has done everything allowed by the
American patent system to gain an advantage in obtaining patent
protection.
[25] Most critics of the first-to-invent system focus on the conflict that
arises when two independent inventors assert inventorship of the same
72

Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes – A Proposed Re-Definition of “First-toInvent,” 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 759 (1998).
73
Conley, supra note 11, at 783.
74
Id. at 784.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
See 35 U.S.C. §119 (2002) (addressing the benefit of the earlier foreign filing date)
and 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000) (addressing the benefit of the earlier American filing date).
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claimed subject matter. This conflict is referred to as a priority dispute.
Because the United States Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issues only
one patent for the claimed subject matter of the invention,78 the PTO
established a mechanism for resolving a priority dispute.79 This
mechanism is known as an interference.
[26] The PTO may declare an interference whenever “an application is
made for a patent which . . . would interfere with any pending application,
or with any unexpired patent . . . .”80 The party with the earliest filing date
is designated the “senior party” and all other parties are labeled “junior
parties.” The junior party bears the burden of establishing priority of
invention.81 Because “[p]riority of invention is a question of law to be
determined based upon underlying factual determinations,”82 the parties
must establish their asserted date of conception with corroborating
evidence.83

78

35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) (providing “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.”) (emphasis added).
79
See generally 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1999); PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2300-2309 (2001) [hereinafter MPEP].
80
35 U.S.C. § 135 (1952). Alternatively, priority disputes may also arise in the context
of an infringement action, where the accused infringer asserts that the plaintiff was not
the first inventor. See, e.g., Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (the defendant asserted that the invention had been known prior to the plaintiff's
date of invention). Determining the date of “invention” is not restricted only to the
activities of the alleged infringer and the patentee. The alleged infringer may offer
evidence that a unrelated third party had completed the invention prior to the patentee,
thereby rendering the patentee’s invention invalid for want of novelty. Id.
81
See Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539, 541 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that the junior party
bears the burden of proving prior conception and reduction to practice); Innovative Scuba
Concepts, Inc. v. Feder Indus., Inc., 26 F.3d 1112, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the
challenger bore the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence and
that this burden remains with the challenger throughout the litigation).
82
Innovative Scuba, 26 F.3d at 1115.
83
See Kridl v. McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that
“[c]onception must be proved by corroborating evidence which shows that the inventor
disclosed to others his ‘complete thought expressed in such clear terms as to enable those
skilled in the art to make the invention.’” (quoting Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359
(Fed. Cir. 1985))).
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[27] Considering the low rate of incidence, interferences receive a
disproportionate share of criticism. For example, in Fiscal Year (FY)
2005, a total of 409,532 patent applications were filed at the PTO,84
bringing the total number of pending applications to 807,379.85 As of
September 30, 2005, only 362 total applications were in interference.86
These 362 applications in interference represent only 0.045% of all
applications under examination. The data for FY 2006 indicate that the
number of interference proceedings has diminished.87 Despite the number
of pending applications increasing by nearly 100,000, the PTO declared
only two more interferences from FY 2005 to FY 2006.
[28] In fact, the number of declared interferences has been consistently
steady and low over a prolonged period of time. For example, the PTO
received 3,151,901 total patent applications between 1983 and 2000.88
During that time, there were 2,858 two-party decisions in interference
cases.89 Using the total number of applications filed during that seventeen
year span as the denominator, the number of two-party decisions was
0.1% of the total applications filed.90 Similarly, using the number of
patents granted as the denominator, the percentage of two-party decisions
was still less than 0.2% of all patents granted.91
[29] Furthermore, in its Performance and Accountability Report for FY
2005, the PTO highlighted the recent successes of the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). Specifically, the average pendency for
84

U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR 2005, 118 tbl.1 [hereinafter PTO FY 2005], available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/com/annual/2005/2005annualreport.pdf.
85
Id. at 122 tbl.5.
86
Id.
87
As of September 2006, only 364 of the 905,869 pending applications were in
interference. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2006, 124 tbl.5 [hereinafter PTO FY 2006], available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2006/2006annualreport.pdf.
88
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to
Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 425, 427 (2002).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
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interferences was less than twelve months.92 The PTO also reported that a
final decision in over 80% of interferences was mailed within twenty-four
months of declaration.93 That percentage escalated to over 90% in the FY
2006.94 Similarly, the BPAI began development of “a full-scale electronic
filing and information system for interferences” which will “lay the
groundwork for the implementation of the proposed post-grant review
proceedings that are currently planned to be conducted in the future at the
Board . . . .”95
PART IV. THE PROPOSED FIRST-TO-FILE PATENT SYSTEM
[30] To date, every patent-granting country other than the United States
utilizes the first-to-file patent system. A tremendous volume of work has
been dedicated to the discussion and comparison of the two systems.96
92

PTO FY 2005, supra note 84, at 25.
Id.
94
PTO FY 2006, supra note 87, at 23.
95
PTO FY 2005, supra note 84, at 25.
96
See generally Mark T. Banner & John J. McDonnell, First-to-File, Mandatory
Reexamination, and Mandatory “Exceptional Circumstance”: Ideas for Better? Or
Worse?, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 595 (1987); Coe A. Bloomberg, In
Defense of the First-to-Invent Rule, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 255 (1993); Sean T. Carnathan,
Patent Priority Disputes - A Proposed Re-Definition of “First-to-Invent,” 49 ALA. L.
REV. 755 (1998); Conley, supra note 11; Donald R. Dunner, First to File: Should Our
Interference System Be Abolished?, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 561 (1986);
Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard
in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 193 (1989); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The
U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to Small Entities, 84 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 425 (2002); Bernarr R. Pravel, Why the United States Should
Adopt the First-to-File System for Patents, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 797 (1991); Toshiko
Takenaka, Rethinking the United States First-to-Invent Principle from a Comparative
Law Perspective: A Proposal to Restructure § 102 Novelty and Priority Provisions, 39
HOUS. L. REV. 621 (2002); Edward C. Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the
United States Came to Have a “First-to-Invent” Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263
(1995); Karen M. Curesky, Note, International Patent Harmonization Through W.I.P.O.:
An Analysis of the U.S. Proposal to Adopt a “First-To-File” Patent System, 21 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 289 (1989); Vito J. DeBari, Note, International Harmonization of
Patent Law: A Proposed Solution to the United States’ First-to-File Debate, 16
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 687 (1992-93); Stephanie Gore, Comment, “Eureka! But I Filed Too
Late . . .”: The Harm/Benefit Dichotomy of a First-to-File Patent System, 1993 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 293 (1993); Peter A. Jackman, Essay, Adoption of a First-to-File
93
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Many believe the primary advantage of the first-to-file system is its
administrative efficiency.97 Under this system, an accurate prior art search
requires only an examination of the PTO database for pending and issued
patents disclosing the same invention. Furthermore, the deference to the
act of filing will alleviate many of the long delays and uncertainties faced
by inventors under the first-to-invent system.98 “[T]he question of right to
a patent between interfering parties would be satisfied by a quick
examination of filing dates, thus eliminating the need for interference
proceedings.”99 Because the first-to-file system naturally dispenses with
the “expense and complexities associated with trying to determine who
invented first,”100 the resolution of a priority dispute “do[es] not involve
complex proofs or extended proceedings.”101
[31] Many argue that this certainty of priority and the improvement in
administrative efficiency will improve patent quality and decrease patent
litigation.102 Proponents of the first-to-file system believe that using the
filing date of a patent application is socially preferable to using the mental
Patent System: A Proposal, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 67 (1997); Kim Taylor, Note, Patent
Harmonization Treaty Negotiations on Hold: The “First to File” Debate Continues, 20 J.
CONTEMP. L. 521 (1994).
97
2 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 8:36 (4th ed. 2006).
98
See Robert A. Armitage & Richard C. Wilder, Harmonization: Will it Resuscitate a
Patent System Suffocating Its Small Entity Users with Cost and Complexity?, 1 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 116, 117 (1993) (explaining that under the current first-to-invent
system, an inventor cannot be certain for some time that his application will go
unchallenged).
99
Robert W. Pritchard, The Future is Now – The Case for Patent Harmonization, 20
N.C.J. INT’L. L. & COM. Reg. 291, 313 (1995).
100
Doug Harvey, Comment, Reinventing the U.S. Patent System: A Discussion of Patent
Reform Through an Analysis of the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005, 38 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 1133, 1140 (2006). See also Perspectives on Patents: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law
Association) (stating that according to AIPLA’s 2003 Economic Survey, the median cost
necessary to complete the preliminary phase or discovery in a simple two-party
interference is $113,000. The cost through final resolution escalates to over $300,000.
Furthermore, the all-inclusive cost for each party in interference was $600,000 in 2005,
$302,000 in 2003, and was $201,000 in 2001).
101
MOY, supra note 97.
102
See Takenaka, supra note 96, at 654-55.
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act of conception or the physical act of invention.103 Because a patent
application ultimately matures into a public disclosure, the first-to-file
system places the invention into society more quickly,104 thereby
furthering the constitutional mandate of “promot[ing] the progress of
science and useful arts . . . .”105
[32] Some commentators believe that the first-to-file system provides a
fairness to smaller entities that is lacking in the first-to-invent system.
Former Commissioner of Patents Gerald J. Mossinghoff summarized
seventeen years of interference data from the PTO by concluding that the
current first-to-invent system has not provided any advantage to small
entities.106 Mossinghoff argued that the current first-to-invent system
often forces a small entity into a financially burdensome interference with
“a large and determined company” that filed subsequent to the small
entity.107 Because the parties “are almost exclusively financiallyresourceful assignees,”108 the only choice for that small entity may be the
abandonment of its application. The mere threat of provoking expensive
patent litigation may scare a small company away from either offering a
new product or pursuing the development of one in the first place.109 This
type of bullying is an “effective barrier to numerous ‘first’ inventors,”110
and stifles, rather than promotes, innovation.111 In this way, large
established companies with huge litigation resources are able to extract
103

MOY, supra note 97. See George E. Frost, The 1967 Patent Law Debate - First-toInvent vs. First-to-File, 1967 DUKE L.J. 923, 925-26 (1967).
104
Curesky, supra note 96, at 296. Currently, the pendency for the first office action is
shortest for Technology Center 2800 – Semiconductor, Electrical, Optical Systems and
Components (16.4 months) and longest for Technology Center 2100 – Computer
Architecture, Software & Information Security (30.8 months). Technology Center 2800
has the shortest average pendency (25.4 months) while Technology Center 2100 has the
longest average pendency (44.0 months). PTO FY 2006, at 123, tbl.4.
105
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
106
Mossinghoff, supra note 88, at 428.
107
Id.
108
Banner & McDonnell, supra note 96, at 607 (quoting ABA PTC Committee Report
108 (1986)).
109
See, e.g., FRED WARSHOFSKY, PATENT WARS: THE BATTLE TO OWN THE WORLD’S
TECHNOLOGY 248-49 (1994).
110
Curesky, supra note 96, at 296.
111
WARSHOFSKY, supra note 109, at 245-71.
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“blood money” from smaller companies with the mere threat of a patent
suit.112
[33] Based on his empirical data, Mossinghoff advocated the adoption of
the first-to-file system.113 He asserted that “small entities by their very
nature can move more quickly than larger bureaucracies . . . [and] by
filing a complete technical disclosure . . . [small entities] can readily
secure priority rights in a first-inventor-to-file system without a major
expenditure of resources . . . .”114 According to Mossinghoff, a small
entity can find relief in a provisional application. Later, when the
invention is more completely developed, the small entity can file a
complete non-provisional application.115 Under the first-to-file system,
the lure of procedural ease is substantial. An individual inventor can be
taught to file an early application more easily than the inventor can be
trained to maintain the quantity and quality of records necessary to prevail
in a priority dispute under the current first-to-invent system.
[34] Interestingly, the first-to-file system does not necessarily value filing
over inventorship, but rather, it emphasizes disclosure. Under the first-toinvent system, a first inventor who fails to fully develop an invention
might be awarded the patent over a subsequent “independent inventor who
is prepared to develop, manufacture, and market that item.”116 Under the
same circumstances, the first-to-file system “would not have the
undesirable effect of preventing an independent, but second, inventor from
marketing his or her product in a situation in which the first inventor is not
yet willing or able to take the first steps toward doing so.”117 The first-tofile system also offers some protection to an applicant who was
sufficiently active prior to the application’s filling date, but was not the
first applicant to file.118 Often referred to as “prior user’s rights,” these
rights offer later inventors an incentive to continue their innovation, which
112

Id. at 251-52, 267.
See, Mossinghoff, supra note 88, at 427-28 (concluding that “there are many good
reasons why the United States should . . . adopt[] a first-inventor-to-file system.”).
114
Id. at 428.
115
Id.
116
Curesky, supra note 96, at 296.
117
Id.
118
MOY, supra note 97.
113
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incentive is lacking in the “all-or-nothing” approach of the first-to-invent
system.119
[35] Lastly, the adoption of the first-to-file system is a prerequisite for
global harmonization. In its 21st Century Strategic Plan, the PTO outlined
its ongoing efforts to “[s]treamline intellectual property systems and
strengthen intellectual property rights around the world.”120 Specifically,
119

Under the current first-to-invent system, the prior use of an invention may invalidate
a subsequent patent. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and (b). Upon invalidation of the patent,
the subject matter reverts to the public domain. Also, under the current first-to-file
system, an inventor who does not secure patent protection for his invention may later be
prohibited from practicing or using his invention by the likelihood of infringing another’s
patent. Section 273 of the proposed Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992, however,
provided limited but important rights to the prior user of an invention. Section 273 reads:
A person shall not be liable as an infringer under a
patent granted to another with respect to any subject
matter claimed in the patent that such person has,
acting in good faith, commercially used or
commercially sold in the United States, or has made
effective and serious preparation therefore [sic] in the
United States, before the filling date or priority date
of the application for patent. . . . [r]ights based on
prior use under this section are personal and shall not
be subject to assignment or transfer to any other
person or persons except in connection with the
assignment or transfer of the entire business or
enterprise to which the rights relate. [Derivation] A
person shall be deemed to have acted in good faith in
establishing rights under this section if the subject
matter has not been derived from the inventor.
See Patent System Harmonization Act, S. 2605, 102d Cong. (1992), available at
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d102:s.02605:; see also H.R. 4978, 102d
Cong. (1992), available at http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d102:HR04978:.
Under § 273, a prior user would receive the personal right to continue his practice of the
invention without liability as an infringer under a subsequently granted patent. This
exemption requires a user to demonstrate his own commercial use or preparation of the
invention in the United States prior to the filing date of the patent. Furthermore, § 273
prohibits the transfer or sale of these rights. See, e.g., Griswold & Ubel, supra note 7, at
571.
120
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 7
(2003), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/stratplan_03feb2003.pdf [hereinafter PTO
Strategic Plan].
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the PTO listed the first objective of “Global Development” as “resolv[ing]
major issues in a broader context and pursu[ing] substantive
harmonization goals that will strengthen the rights of American
intellectual property holders by making it easier to obtain international
protection for their inventions and creations.”121 Because the United
States is the only nation using the first-to-invent system, its adherence to
this system prevents its participation in those harmonization treaties
designed to facilitate global intellectual property protection.
PART V. THE CALL FOR PATENT REFORM
[36] Despite its proven success, the American patent system has been at
the center of the reform debate for decades.122 Among the several areas of
patent practice targeted for reform are post-grant opposition, continuation
applications, re-definition of prior art, the best mode requirement, and the
adoption of the first-to-file system. Proponents of reform aim to improve
patent quality, streamline administrative procedures at the PTO, and
provide a better system for rewarding innovation.123
[37] The United States International Trade Commission, a government
agency authorized to investigate unfair import practices, estimates that the
United States loses approximately 23.8 billion dollars annually due to
piracy of intellectual property that originated in the United States.124
Because the United States suffers as a result of this intellectual property
121

Id. at 7.
In 1967, the President’s Commission on the Patent System identified six areas for
patent reform: 1) raise the quality and the reliability of the United States patent; 2)
shorten the total pendency of an application; 3) accelerate the public disclosure of
technological advances; 4) reduce the expenses of litigation; 5) make United States’
patent practice more compatible with that of other major countries and more consistent
with the objectives of the United States’ patent system; and 6) prepare our patent system
to handle the technology explosion of the near future. S. DOC. NO. 90-5, at 11-12 (1967).
123
Brad Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, The Rush to a First-to-File Patent System in the
United States: Is a Globally Standardized Patent Reward System Really Beneficial to
Patent Quality and Administrative Efficiency?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 757, 759
(2006).
124
Jeffrey K. Sheldon & Danton K. Mak, First-to-File v. First-to-Invent: A Bone of
Contention in the International Harmonization of U.S. Patent Law,
http://www.usip.com/articles/1st2fil.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
122
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theft, both domestic and foreign pressure to reform the American patent
system by harmonizing with other nations across the globe has been
mounting.
A. Foreign Pressure
[38] As the only country operating under a first-to-invent system, the
United States is at the center of the patent harmonization debate. As
scholar Edward Lee has argued, there is an increased incentive for entities
to seek intellectual property protection both domestically and abroad in
today’s global market.125 “Something considered a valuable commodity in
one place . . . is likely to be a valuable commodity in other places around
the world, but entities do not have the luxury of obtaining a single grant of
IP protection that applies universally.”126 The lack of uniformity amongst
the various patent-granting countries complicates an applicant’s attempts
to secure widespread protection for his invention. The World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) hopes to alleviate this complication.
[39] In 1984, WIPO convened a committee of experts to draft a treaty for
the international harmonization of patent law.127 By 1991, the Draft
Treaty was ready for review128 and a convention of international delegates
assembled to discuss it.129 The treaty contained provisions that would
have required the United States to make serious modifications to its patent

125

Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing Foreign Law to Decide Domestic
Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 1, 9 (2005).
126
Id.
127
Edward G. Fiorito, The “Basic Proposal” for Harmonization of U.S. and Worldwide
Patent Laws Submitted by WIPO, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 83, 84 (1991).
See also Draft Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property as far as Patents are Concerned, U.N. W.I.P.O., U.N. Doc. PLT/DC/3 (1990).
128
Fiorito, supra note 127, at 88. On December 21, 1990, WIPO published a basic
proposal draft treaty. Article 9, § 2 was entitled “Two or More Inventors Claim the Same
Invention” and read, “The invention shall belong to the applicant with the earliest priority
date.”
129
See Memorandum prepared by the Chairman of the Committees of Experts, WIPO
CRNR/DC/6 (August 30, 1996), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/
olia/diplconf/6dc_mem.htm (providing a summary of the activities of WIPO as it pertains
to the Draft Treaty and patent harmonization).
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practice.130 The treaty discussions were progressing satisfactorily and the
final session was scheduled for July 1993, but the United States
indefinitely delayed the final session131 and then later failed to return to
the negotiations.132 On January 24, 1994, Commerce Secretary Ronald H.
Brown officially announced that the United States would not sign the
Patent Harmonization Treaty, but rather, it would “maintain [its] first-toinvent system, while keeping open the option of full patent harmonization
in the future.”133
[40] Despite the convention’s failure to ratify the Draft Treaty, some
progress toward harmonization has been made. Subsequently, on
December 8, 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the North American Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, which became effective on January
1, 1994.134 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
contained several provisions relating to intellectual property law.135
According to the agreement, Canada, Mexico, and the United States must
“accord nationals of the other parties [sic] treatment no less favorable than
130

The treaty mandated the adoption of the first-to-file system and created an
accompanying prior use defense. The treaty also required publication of patent
applications and a determination of the patent term based on the filing date rather than the
issuance date. In exchange for these concessions, the United States asked for 1) a grace
period for disclosures, 2) the removal of the absolute novelty provision, 3) the removal of
the pre-grant opposition proceeding, 4) the ability to file applications in English, with the
English copy to serve as the official copy in cases of translation errors, and 5) an
international doctrine of equivalents. Anneliese M. Seifert, Will the United States Take
the Plunge Into Global Patent Law Harmonization? A Discussion of the United States’
Past, Present, and Future Harmonization Efforts, 6 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV 173,
184 (2002).
131
Pritchard, supra note 99, at 301-02.
132
The United States initially justified the delay by stating that it needed time to select a
new commissioner of PTO and formulate a clear position on patent harmonization. Id.
133
See U.S. Says “Not Now” on First-to-File and Agrees with Japan on Patent Term, 47
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1164, at 285 (Jan. 27, 1994). See also The
Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, A Report to the Secretary of Commerce
45 (1992) (stating that the United States is reluctant to switch unless it can “obtain[] a
favorable harmonization ‘package’ which, on the whole, provides a net positive benefit to
U.S. inventors around the world.”).
134
Bill to Implement NAFTA Signed with Provisions that Affect IP Law, 47 Pat. &
Trademark Copyright J. (BNA) 139 (1993) [hereinafter Bill to Implement].
135
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (2002).
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that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights.”136 To comply with this
provision, the United States amended section 104 of the Patent Act to read
“an applicant for a patent, or a patentee, may not establish a date of
invention by reference to knowledge or use thereof, or other activity with
respect thereto, in a foreign country other than a NAFTA country . . . .”137
This amendment placed inventors in these foreign countries on equal
footing with American inventors. Following this amendment, inventive
acts occurring in Canada or Mexico were acceptable forms of evidence
during a priority dispute.138
[41] The negotiations for a second major treaty, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), ended on December 15, 1993.139 The
GATT negotiations produced the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement.140 Hailed by participants as one of
the most significant sections of the pact,141 the TRIPs Agreement
obligated over 140 countries belonging to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) to provide minimum standards of protection for intellectual
property rights.142 However, for those issues not governed by a
predetermined minimum standard, the TRIPs Agreement allows its
signatories to employ their own, and sometimes widely varying,
136

Bill to Implement, supra note 134, at 139.
35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (2002). Prior to NAFTA, 35 U.S.C. § 104 restricted evidence
of inventive acts to events occurring in the United States. NAFTA expanded that
geographic limitation to include inventive acts occurring in Canada and Mexico. See
NAFTA § 4(A)-(B).
138
35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(3). In short, American inventors must now compete against large
companies with disposable resources from two additional countries in interference
proceedings. Hence, the statutory advantage that once favored the small and less solvent
inventor over foreign corporations in Canada and Mexico has disappeared.
139
Uruguay Round of GATT Talks are Concluded With IP Provisions, 47 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 170, 170 (Dec. 23, 1993).
140
Id.
141
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade
in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M 81, 95 (1994) [hereinafter The TRIPS
Agreement].
142
The TRIPs Agreement, however, did not synchronize intellectual property laws, but
rather, provided a baseline from which its various signatories can deviate. See generally
id.
137
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approaches. Furthermore, Article 27 requires all parties to the TRIPs
Agreement to make patents available “without discrimination as to the
place of invention.”143 Once again, the United States amended section 104
of the Patent Act. The new version of section 104 allows an inventor to
establish a date of invention with evidence of conception, diligence, and
reduction to practice in any WTO member nation.144
B. Domestic Pressure
[42] In 1965, the United States Presidential Committee on the Patent
System exhaustively examined the American patent system.145 The
committee made thirty-five specific recommendations for significant
changes to patent practice,146 including the adoption of the first-to-file
patent system. At that time, widespread opposition from several industry
and legal associations prompted Congress to reject the adoption of the
first-to-file system.147

143

The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 141, at 93-94.
35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1).
145
Recognizing that the “general character of [the] patent system ha[d] undergone no
substantial change since 1836,” President Lyndon B. Johnson established The President’s
Commission on the Patent System. The President charged the Commission with:
1) ascertaining the degree to which our patent system currently serves
our national needs and international goals, (2) identifying any aspects
of the system which may need change, (3) devising possible
improvements in the system, and (4) recommending any legislation
deemed essential to strengthen the United States patent system. In
carrying out its evaluation, and in achieving these objectives, the
Commission shall make an independent study of the existing patent
system of the United States including its relationship to international
and foreign patent systems, inventive activity and the administration of
the system.
Exec. Order No. 11215, 30 Fed. Reg. at 4661 (Apr. 8, 1965).
146
To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, Report of the President’s Comm’n on the
Patent System, S. DOC. NO. 90-5, at 3-4 (1967). Among the recommendations of the
President’s Commission were 1) to raise the quality and the reliability of the United
States patent, 2) to shorten the total pendency of a patent application, 3) to accelerate the
public disclosure of technological advances, 4) to reduce the expenses of litigation, 5) to
make the American patent process more compatible with that of other major countries,
and 6) to prepare the patent system to handle the imminent technology explosion. Id.
147
Conley, supra note 11, at 781.
144
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[43] However, when the PTO declared in its 21st Century Strategic Plan
that “the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) [was] under
siege,”148 Congress responded by proffering a number of proposals for
patent reform. For example, on October 8, 2004, Representative Howard
Berman (D-CA) introduced House Report 5299 entitled the “Patent
Quality Assistance Act of 2004.”149 Beginning on April 20, 2005, the
House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property
conducted hearings on its Committee Print Regarding Patent Quality
Improvement.150 Several prominent organizations testified at the hearings
including the Patent and Trademark Office, the American Bar Association,
the Intellectual Property Owners Association, and the Business Software
Alliance.151 Following the hearings, Representative Lamar Smith (R-TX),
the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property, revised the Committee Print and introduced House
Report 2795 entitled the “Patent Reform Act of 2005.”152 On July 26,
2005, he subsequently entered an amendment in the form of a substitution
to House Report 2795..153 In early April 2006, Representatives Berman
(CA-28) and Rick Boucher (D-VA) introduced into the House of
Representatives the “Patents Depend on Quality Act” or House Report
5096.154 Interestingly, the Patents Depend on Quality Act omitted several
key provisions previously introduced by House Report 2795, including the
statutory adoption of the first-to-file system.155
[44] Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) offered one
of the most recent of these congressional patent reform proposals. On
148

PTO Strategic Plan, supra note 120, at 1.
Patent Quality Assistance Act of 2004, H.R. 5299, 108th Cong. 1 (2004), available at
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.05299:.
150
See generally Patent Quality Improvement Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Hearings], available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/109th/20709.pdf.
151
Id. at III.
152
Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.2795:.
153
Id.
154
Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h109-5096.
155
Id.
149
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August 3, 2006, the senators introduced Senate Bill 3108 entitled the
“Patent Reform Act of 2006.”156 Senate Bill 3108 required a statutory
adoption of the first-to-file patent system for awarding priority in a patent
dispute.157 As Senator Leahy explained, “if the United States is to
preserve its position at the forefront of innovation, as the global leader in
intellectual property and technology, then we need to move forward . . .
[t]his legislation is not an option, but a necessity.”158 The bill was referred
to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.159
[45] On April 17, 2007, both Representative Berman and Senator Leahy
introduced the Patent Reform Act of 2007.160 Both bills discard the
current first-to-invent system for awarding priority and, instead, provide
rights to the first-inventor-to-file. Consequently, both bills also eliminate
interference proceedings.161 Furthermore, both bills require the Under
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office to provide various
Congressional committees with a report detailing “the operation of prior
user rights in selected countries in the industrialized world.”162 On
September 7, 2007, the House of Representatives passed House Report

156

Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.03818:.
157
Id.
158
Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Hatch Introduce Sweeping Patent
Reform Bill (Aug. 4, 2006), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200608/080406.html.
159
All pertinent Congressional actions regarding S. 3818 are available at
http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.03818:.
160
Govtrack.us, Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Congress (2007),
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-1908 (last visted Oct. 8, 2007);
Govtrack.us, Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Congress (2007),
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145 (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
161
Govtrack.us, Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Congress (2007) § 3 Right
of the First Inventor to File, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h1101908 (last visited Oct. 8, 2007); Govtracks.us, Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th
Congress (2007), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145 (last visited
Oct. 8, 2007).
162
Govtrack.us, Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Congress (2007) § 5 Right
of the Inventor to Obtain Damages,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-1908 (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
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1908 by a vote of 220 Ayes to 175 Nays.163 On Sep 11, 2007, the Senate
placed House Report 1908 on the Senate Legislative Calendar under
General Orders, Calendar No. 348.164
[46] The private sector also became very active in the patent reform
debate. Following the Oversight Hearings and the introduction of H.R.
2795, the American Intellectual Property Law Association drafted a
proposal for patent reform entitled “Balanced and Achievable Patent Law
Reform, Now.”165 The proposal, a redline mark-up version of H.R. 2795,
advocated the elimination of the best mode requirement, codification of
the duty of candor, and the adoption of the first-to-file patent system.166
Likewise, on September 1, 2005, the Coalition for 21st Century Patent
Law Reform provided a redline mark-up version of H.R. 2795.167
Comprised of companies such as Cargill, Pfizer, 3M Company, General
Electric, Merck, Monsanto, and Johnson & Johnson,168 the Coalition
“advocat[es] for patent reforms that will continue to foster innovation and
enhance American competitiveness.”169
[47] However, each of these congressional attempts to introduce patent
reform has failed due to the termination of the legislative session.

163

Govtrack.us, Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Congress (2007),
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1908#votes (last visited Oct. 8,
2007).
164
Id.
165
American Intellectual Property Law Association, Balanced and Achievable Patent
Law Reform, Now, 2005, http://www.fr.com/news/AchievablePatentReform.pdf.
166
Id.
167
American Intellectual Property Law Association, A Coalition for 21st Century Patent
Law Reform: Balanced Initiatives to Advance Quality and Provide Litigation Reforms,
Sept. 1 2005, http://www.fr.com/news/2005-09-14_Coalition_Draft.pdf.
168
For more information on the Coalition, please see its website, available at
http://www.patentsmatter.com/index.php. A list of Coalition members is available at
http://www.patentsmatter.com/about/coalition.php.
169
The Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform, Patents Matter,
http://www.patentsmatter.com/about/who_we_are.php (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
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PART VI. WHY FIRST-TO-FILE IS NOT THE ANSWER
[48] The primary motivation behind global patent harmonization is the
consistency and uniformity of intellectual property laws and protection.
Aligning the American system with those of the European Union and
Japan would allow for mutual reciprocity between these three patent
systems,170 particularly as it relates to acknowledging and enforcing those
patents granted by any one of these patent giants.171 Authors Dana
Rohrabacher and Paul Crilly caution, however, against harmonizing the
patent system for reciprocity purposes. These authors liken patent
harmonization to Ulysses’ Trojan horse.172 In short, this seemingly
innocuous action will whittle down America’s strong patent system. The
authors wrote:
Yes, uniformity of law throughout the world has a ring to
it. However, harmonization is being paid for by decreasing
our guaranteed patent term. Uniformity merely for its own
sake and without any quantitative benefit to Americans
does not make any sense. If the objective is to have a
uniform worldwide patent system, other nations should
adopt the stronger United States model.173
Even now, the United States is tempted by the lure of patent
harmonization and reciprocity. Congress has already amended the Patent
170

Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 765.
Id. at 766. See Michael D. Kaminski, Patent Harmonization: International Efforts
Are Gradually Unifying the World's Patent Laws, 4 MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY, JAN.
2001, at 36-37, available at
http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/mdd/v04/i01/html/patents.html; see also United
States Patent & Trademark Office, Pursuit of Substantive Patent Law Harmonization,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/gd1i01.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2007) (stating the goal of promoting harmonization and making it easier for American
intellectual property holders to obtain international protection); United States Patent &
Trademark Office, Statement of Intent,
http://www.uspto.gov/main/homepagenews/bak08feb2005.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007)
(stating desire “to consider: (i) substantive patent law harmonization issues, notably the
Trilateral ‘first package,’ as developed by the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
the European Patent Office and the Japan Patent Office[.]”).
172
Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 263, 272 (1995).
173
Id.
171
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Act on several occasions to synchronize its laws with foreign countries,
which in the case of §104, has been detrimental to the American
inventor.174
[49] Is abandonment of the American first-to-invent system truly that
desirable? How will the first-to-file system benefit the American patent
machine? As one commentator urged, “[a] first-to-file statute that would
give patent rights to the more astute filer rather than the more astute
inventor is . . . impermissible.”175 After all, reward for innovation is the
hallmark of the American patent system. In fact, many believe that this is
the key factor behind this system’s success.176 The first-to-file system is
not the panacea it pretends to be, and therefore, “[i]t should be of no
concern to us that the majority of countries have a first-to-file system. A
system that is inferior doesn’t become less so because it has many more
adherents.”177

174

See id. The United States has twice amended 35 U.S.C. § 104, and now allows
applicants to present evidence of inventive acts in any WTO nation. 35 U.S.C. § 104
(2000). Furthermore, the term of patent protection was altered to conform to the
international standard set forth in the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999. 35
U.S.C. §§ 5, 6, 273, 297, 311-18 (2000). The United States amended § 122(b) in 2000 to
require the publication of a patent application after eighteen months; § 271(a) in 2003 to
designate “offers to sell” and “importation” as forms of patent infringement, and; §
154(a)(2) in 2002 to change the patent term from seventeen years after issuance, to
twenty years after filing. 35 U.S.C. §§ 122(b), 271(a), 154(a)(2).
175
David L. Simon, The First-to-File Provisions of the Patent Reform Act of 2005
Violate the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause (2005),
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog_docs/First-to-file_unconstitutional.pdf.
176
See Conley, supra note 11, at 782 (“There can be little doubt that the United States'
patent system . . . has been the most successful in the world. The technological lead . . .
cannot be explained by our having smarter people, or more daring people, or better
educated people, or more government support for technological development.”).
177
Gabriel Katona, First-to-File – Not in the United States, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC'Y 399, 399-400 (1991). Furthermore, it is shortsighted to believe that the firstto-file system will rectify American patent woes. “The situation in this country cannot be
compared to that in other countries which have lived for a long time under a first-to-file
system.” Id. at 400.
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A. The First-to-File System Stifles Innovation
[50] The current American patent system is unique because it stimulates
extraordinary progress. “Under the first-to-invent system, the main
incentive to innovate is the hope of profit. Accordingly, a system that
gives the exclusive right to this profit without diverting any portion of it to
other inventors optimizes this motivation.”178 For instance, Professor
Conley concluded “the United States’ patent system has been one of the
major differences between the environments in which inventors work.
That system is and has been unique among the democratic, capitalistic,
developed nations which have political and economic systems conducive
to success in technological development.”179 Even advocates of the firstto-file patent system acknowledge that the American system has been
extremely successful. During its congressional testimony, the American
Bar Association stated, “[i]t seems quite likely that features that
distinguish our patent system from those countries which have not
experienced our remarkable rate of growth, are . . . responsible for that
rate of growth. Surely the most significant of those features is our system
rewarding the first to invent . . . .”180
[51] The American patent system provides more incentive to innovate
than the first-to-file system.181 In those countries using a first-to-file
system, there is a relative decrease in the number of inventions.182 This
178

Stephanie Gore, ‘Eureka! But I Filed Too Late . . .’: The Harm/Benefit Dichotomy of
a First-to-File Patent System, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 293, 311 (1993). The
success of the American patent system over the past 200 years stems from the
conveyance of exclusive monopolistic rights to the first inventor, which provides
tremendous financial incentive to an innovator. Id. When compared with the United
States’ first-to-invent patent system, the first-to-file system does provide a sufficient
incentive because the patent is awarded to the inventor who files first and prior users’
rights break up any monopoly. Id. See also Brad Pedersen & Vadim Braginsky, The
Rush to a First-to-File Patent System in the United States: Is a Globally Standardized
Patent Reward System Really Beneficial to Patent Quality and Administrative
Efficiency?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 759, 765 (2006).
179
Conley, supra note 11, at 782.
180
Christian J. Garascia, Evidence of Conception in U.S. Patent Interference Practice:
Proving Who Is the First and True Inventor, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 717, 723 n.49
(1996).
181
Conley, supra note 11, at 782.
182
Gore, supra note 178, at 311. See also id. at 787.
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trend is likely linked to the fact that in the United States, “the focus of the
patent system is to protect the individual patentees and provide them with
exclusive rights to their inventions.”183 This concept resonates with all
parties who aim to protect their intellectual property because the reward
for hard work and ingenuity is inextricably linked to the American dream.
[52] The first-to-file system is not based on conception. Rather, this
system recognizes ownership rights only in technology that finds its way
into the disclosure of a patent application.184 Therefore, the adoption of
the first-to-file system would reduce the incentive for small entities and
individual inventors to innovate and subsequently file patent applications.
Consequently, “fewer patents would issue to entrepreneurs and the United
States would lose a major factor affecting its lead in technological
development.”185
B. Patent Quality Will Suffer Under the First-to-File System
[53] Patent quality has been defined as “a broad, multi-faceted concept
most often discussed in the abstract without any specific context that
would permit quantifiable measurement.”186 Different aspects of patent
quality include validity, notice, teaching, and value.187 The first-to-file
system poses a threat to each one of these indicators.188
183

Intellectual Property Rights, U.S. Companies’ Comparative Patent Experiences in
Japan, Europe, and the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of
the S. Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong. 71 (1994) (statement of Alan I. Mendelowitz,
Director of International Trade, Finance, and Competitiveness Issues, General
Government Division, United States General Accounting Office).
184
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: U.S.
COMPANIES’ PATENT EXPERIENCES IN JAPAN 1 (1993) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
185
Conley, supra note 11, at 787. “The National Patent Council told the Congressional
Committee considering first-to-file in the 1960s that such a change in the U.S. patent
laws ‘would load the dice against one of the most potent innovating forces in our
economy: the initiative and drive of the independent inventor and small businessman.’”
Id.
186
Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 768.
187
Id. at 768-69. The authors describe patent quality as follows: “(1) the validity of the
issued claims (the ‘validity facet’), (2) the extent of the claim scope (the ‘notice facet’),
(3) the effectiveness of the patent at teaching the invention to society (the ‘teaching
facet’), and (4) the value, or usefulness, of the patented invention itself (the ‘value facet’).
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[54] Because “the objective of a first-to-file patent system is, in effect, to
reward early filing and punish late filing,”189 many believe the first-to-file
system endorses a “race to the patent office.”190 This race to the PTO
causes several problems. First, the first-to-file system does not afford an
inventor a choice.191 The inventor no longer has the opportunity to
develop the invention through its entirety, knowing that the invention is
protected under a priority system that awards conception and diligence
rather than the ministerial act of filing a patent application. Such a process
of awarding priority of inventorship will precipitate “hasty application
drafting with limited experimental exemplification or support.”192 In
Id. at 768. See also R. Polk Wagner, The Patent Quality Index (2006),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/polk/pqi/documents/2006_1_presentation.pdf.
188
Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 769. See also American Innovation at
Risk: The Case for Patent Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Suzanne Michel, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel & Deputy Assistant
Director of Public Coordination, FTC). Michel remarked that patents of questionable
quality can “distort competition, innovation, and the marketplace . . . .” Id. Michel listed
four ways by which this can occur. First, questionable patents “slow follow-on
innovation by discouraging firms from conducting research and development in areas that
the patent improperly covers . . . [s]econd, patents that should not have been granted raise
costs when they are challenged in litigation . . . [t]hird, questionable patents may raise
costs by inducing unnecessary licensing . . . [f]ourth, firms facing patent thickets may
spend resources obtaining ‘defensive patents,’ not to protect their own innovation from
use by others, but to have ‘bargaining chips’ to obtain access to others’ patents through a
cross-license, or to counter allegations of infringement.” Id.
189
Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 767.
190
A.B.A. SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW, 1987 COMMITTEE
REPORTS 62 (Mark T. Banner ed., 1987). See also MAURICE H. KLITZMANN, PATENT
INTERFERENCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1984).
191
See Conley, supra note 11, at 786. Conley writes:
Often the decision would be forced on the inventor. If funds are
limited, he may not be able to afford to file two or more applications,
he may not be able to pay for a prior art search to help him decide
whether patent protection is likely, he many be able to pay for even the
first, limited disclosure application. He might, out of necessity, have to
wait until the invention is further developed to attract financing from
others.
Id.
192
A.B.A. SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 190, at 62.
See also MAURICE H. KLITZMANN, supra note 190; Banner & McDonnell, supra note 93,
at 610.
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short, the first-to-file system “encourage[s] speculative filing of
applications on unproven inventions by ‘idea men’ rather than actual
development of useful commercial inventions, and would retard rather
than promote progress.”193
[55] Second, the first-to-file system lacks the inherent deterrents of the
first-to-invent system.194 For example, those applicants who later discover
that patent protection is not worth pursuing will have already incurred
substantial costs.195 An applicant in this situation often “proceed[s] with
the patent application, even at the sacrifice of funds needed to develop the
invention, and even though [its] concept is so sketchy that providing a
detailed description of the invention is impossible.”196
[56] Third, the first-to-file system dilutes the quality of patents.
“[A]doption of the first-to-file would change the mentality of many patent
practitioners and applicants.”197 There will be an “inherent disincentive to
prepare a careful and thoughtful patent application in which the prior art is
well-searched and the claims of the invention are initially drafted to
overcome the prior art.”198 Rather, the first-to-file system rewards “quick
and short filings that disclose . . . the details of one aspect of an invention,
but undertake no evaluation of which features or benefits of the invention
distinguish it over the prior art.”199 Consequently, attorneys are more
likely to draft overly broad disclosures, exhibiting less quality in terms of
the teaching and providing adequate notice to the public regarding the
scope of the claimed material.200 In the words of one practitioner, the
“first-to-file” system will generate “sketchy disclosures.”201
193

Conley, supra note 11, at 789. See also Kim Taylor, Note, Patent Harmonization
Treaty Negotiations on Hold: The “First-to-File” Debate Continues, 20 J. CONTEMP. L.
521, 535 (1994).
194
Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International
Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 193, 217-18 (1990).
195
Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 767.
196
Conley, supra note 11, at 786. See also id. at 766-67.
197
Macedo, supra note 194, at 217.
198
Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 767.
199
Id.
200
Id. See also Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that both the Supreme Court of the United States and Federal
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C. The First-to-File System is Unfair to Small Businesses and Independent
Inventors
[57] Most patents are issued to small companies and individual
inventors.202 Because the first-to-file system rewards “the winner . . . to
the Patent Office, and elevates paperwork over true invention,”203 the
adoption of this system by the United States “would load the dice against
one of the most potent innovating forces in [its] economy: the initiative
and drive of the independent inventor and small businessman . . . .”204 The
first-to-file system “favor[s] corporate inventors and multinationals at the
expense of independent inventors and small businesses.”205 Under the
first-to-file system, the first early filing would secure priority, and as the
development of the invention continued, subsequent filings would provide
full protection.206
[58] The repetitious nature of this sort of filing troubles small entities for
two primary reasons. First, large and multinational “organizations have
the requisite monetary, legal, and technical resources to consistently file
first . . . .”207 Independent inventors and small businesses do not.
Therefore, the first-to-file system endangers their economic prosperity
because they simply cannot afford to automatically file applications on
every invention nor can they maintain the practice of filing early and filing
often.208 Second, this type of continuous filing jeopardizes efforts to
Circuit of Appeals adhere to the fundamental principle that claims define the scope of
patent protection).
201
Conley, supra note 11, at 788. See also Donald S. Chisum, The Harmonization of
International Patent Law, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 448 (1993); Taylor, supra note
96, at 535.
202
Robert X. Cringely, Patently Absurd: Patent Reform Legislation in Congress
Amounts to Little More Than a “Get Out of Jail Free” Card for Microsoft, PBS.COM,
Aug. 18, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/2005/pulpit_20050818_000863.html.
203
Taylor, supra note 96, at 536 (citing to Patent Harmonization Proposal Stirs Lively
Debate at PTO Hearing, 46 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 508, 510-11
(1993)).
204
Conley, supra note 11, at 787.
205
Taylor, supra note 96, at 536.
206
Id. at 535. See also Conley, supra note 11, at 787.
207
Gore, supra note 178, at 294.
208
See generally Cringely, supra note 202. See also Katona, supra note 177, at 401-02
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attract new sponsors and researchers.209 The first-to-file system is “likely
to drive up the costs of early-stage technology development by forcing
more money and resources to be expended earlier in the development
process to prepare and file patent applications before actually reducing the
inventions to practice and determining their usefulness or commercial
viability.”210 Hence, the first-to-file system will “pretty much be the death
knell of independent inventors.”211
[59] Small entities cannot survive in such a hostile environment. Under
the first-to-file system, they are at risk of having a “big corporation with
big money highjack[] their ideas and obtain[] an exclusive patent merely
because it filed the patent first.”212 Creativity will suffer as inventors are
discouraged by having to conform to a system that does not reward
innovation, but rather, rewards business acumen and the drive to capitalize
on the ingenuity of others. Conversely, the first-to-invent system levels
the playing field, providing both small and large entities with the same
advantages and disadvantages. For example, in his study, Mossinghoff
determined that “a small entity was advantaged by the first-to-invent
system if the small entity was the junior party in the interference . . . .”213
By awarding the patent on the basis of inventorship rather than on the act
of filing, the first-to-invent system neutralizes the deep pockets of large,
powerful, and extremely solvent companies.
D. The First-to-File System Will Increase Litigation
[60] Advocates of the first-to-file system argue that this system will
provide a certainty of knowledge that cannot be conveyed under the
(suggesting that the first-to-file system “means increased costs to the user, because the
cost of increased filing necessitated by a first-to-file system will undoubtedly exceed the
cost of litigating a rare, very occasional interference under the present system.”).
209
Steven Ludwig, U.S. Patent Reform and the Future of Nanotechnology, 20 LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER, at *3 (2005).
210
Pedersen & Braginsky, supra note 123, at 767-68 n.41.
211
John R. Emshwiller, Patent-Law Proposals Irk Small Inventors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30,
1992, at B1.
212
Doug Harvey, Comment, Reinventing the U.S. Patent System: A Discussion of Patent
Reform Through an Analysis of the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005, 38 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 1133, 1142 (2006).
213
Mossinghoff, supra note 88, at 427.
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current first-to-invent system. Such certainty is elusive. The attempts to
put the essence of an invention into words and to explain how the
invention is patentably novel and nonobvious over all others are
formidable tasks. Even after careful hours of drafting, claims will always
be subject to various interpretations. As one court explained, “[a] verbal
portrayal [of an invention] is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the
requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words allows
for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled . . . [t]hings
are not made for the sake of words, but words for things.”214
[61] As literary descriptions, patent applications are tenuous at best. Any
attempt to indicate otherwise is misleading. Regardless of the type of
patent system, inventors, practitioners, the PTO, and the judiciary will
always operate within a framework of words that naturally create
uncertainty. Therefore, while the system of awarding priority may
influence the nature of the dispute, litigation will never be removed
entirely from the patent equation.
[62] During congressional hearings on patent reform, the Manufacturing
Chemists Association, Inc. stated:
The granting of the patent to the first to file will necessitate the
filing of applications of narrow scope prematurely and encourage
the filing of prophetic, scientifically unsound disclosures by less
meticulous inventors to the detriment of the careful scientist. This
result has long been observed in Europe which has a “first to file”
system. The incomplete disclosures of many European patents
issued in the chemical field are viewed as insufficiently
informative by American Scientists and engineers. In our opinion,
therefore, the adoption of this provision will result in the filing of
many “half-baked” patent applications.215
Under the pressure to file first in the first-to-file system, mistakes will
happen. “A patent application is not like filling in blanks on a form. It
takes time and thought to move from a decent first draft, to a really fine,
214
215

Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
Conley, supra note 11, at 788.
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finished product. So first-to-file will certainly yield some degradation in
the quality of the applications as filed.”216
[63] The first-to-file system will foster poor patent quality, which will
result in an increase in patent litigation. New procedural changes will spur
the filing of suits as the patent bar struggles to make the transition from
the first-to-invent to the first-to-file system. Disappointed, disgruntled,
and confused applicants who were not the first applicants to file will vent
their frustration towards the patent bar. “[T]he litigious nature of
Americans lends the bar’s fears some credibility . . . . Without the
safeguard of swearing back with an affidavit to the invention date,
attorneys will be exposed to liability whenever they fail to file within a
very short time period.”217 The pressure to be the first applicant to file
will lead to a “flood of malpractice suits.”218
E. The First-to-File System Represents a Challenge to the Constitution
[64] Unlike the English Statute of Monopolies, the Intellectual Property
Clause does not include language that explicitly restricts the grant of a
patent to the first and true inventor.219 Many believe that the omission of
the phrase “first and true inventor” permits a patent to be awarded to
someone other than the first inventor and emphasize that Congress failed
to provide a resolution for interfering patents in the Patent Act of 1790.220
However, an analysis of the framers’ intent as well as statutory language
of the early patent acts demonstrate that the Constitution authorizes the
patent to be awarded only to the “first and true inventor.” To hold
otherwise poses a direct challenge to the Constitution.
216

Jack Zemlicka, Patent Changes Pending, WIS. L. J., Oct. 4, 2006,
http:/www.wislawjournal.com/archive/2006/1004/patent.html (quoting remarks of
attorney Joseph T. Leone).
217
Macedo, supra note 194, at 223. Macedo acknowledges that, “the possibility of
malpractice suits, especially during the period when the systems are being changed,
looms large in the patent bar’s eyes.”
218
Id. at 222.
219
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
220
The statute was the Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) [hereinafter Act of 1790].
Thomas M. Marshall, New Interference Rules – Boon or Bust, 5 PAT. L. ANN. 79, 106-07
(1967).
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i. The Constitutional and Statutory Language
[65] Constitutional and statutory language makes it clear that the “first
inventor” deserved the patent. The terms “first and true inventor” and
“original inventor” were codified in the nation’s first two patent acts.221
As the nation’s first patent act, the Patent Act of 1790 bestowed the
monopolistic patent right to “the first and true inventor or discoverer.”222
The act utilized the same language as its English predecessor, the Statute
of Monopolies. According to The Patent Act of 1790, a patent was “prima
facie evidence” that the patentee was the “first and true inventor . . . .”223
The Patent Act of 1790 further provided a process by which a patent could
be repealed if the “patentee was not the first and true inventor or
discoverer.”224 The Patent Act of 1793 reiterated the rules set forth three
years earlier. The Patent Act of 1793 again emphasized awarding the
patent to the “true inventor.”225 This act also voided a patent upon a
showing that “the thing, thus secured by the patent, was not originally
discovered by the patentee,”226 and provided for the repeal of a patent if
the “patentee was not the true inventor or discoverer.”227
[66] Congress’ omission of a provision governing the resolution of
interfering patents from the Patent Act of 1790 does not support a
statutory interpretation that would grant a patent to an applicant other than
the first and true inventor.228 Acting under the original Patent Act of
221

“One commentator explained, ‘the word [‘inventor’] had been made specific in
meaning by its constant association with the modifiers ‘true’ and ‘first’ in the Statute of
Monopolies.’” Macedo, supra note 194, at 213 n.107 (1988) (citing Note, The
Constitutionality of the First-to-File System, 11 IDEA 241 (1967)).
222
Act of 1790 § 5.
223
Id. § 6.
224
Id. §5.
225
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321-22 (1846) [hereinafter Act of 1793].
226
Id. § 6.
227
Id. § 10.
228
Congress’s omission of an interference system from the first patent act should not be
read to weaken the constitutional requirement for such a system. As Marbury v. Madison
confirmed, an error of constitutional significance in a statute passed by the first Congress
(in that instance, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789’s overly broad and thus
unconstitutional grant of jurisdiction to the United States Supreme Court, violative of
Article III, Section 2) in no way diminishes the force of the relevant constitutional clause.
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1790, the patent board addressed one of the most famous priority disputes
in the nation’s history.229 Four different men applied for a patent, each
claiming a steamboat and other related inventions.230 The patent board
held several hearings in April 1791, where the four applicants offered
numerous suggestions for how to resolve the dispute. One such suggestion
was to award the patent to the first applicant to file.231 The patent board
discussed this option and rejected it.232 Upon subsequently reviewing the
evidence, the patent board awarded at least one patent to each of the four
applicants.233 As one scholar noted, “[i]t is very unlikely that duplicate
patents were granted to these four steamboat claimants without deciding
the question of priority.”234
Rather, it is the statute that must give way. When the United States enacted its first
Patent Act in 1790, Congress debated a special mechanism for resolution of patent
priority disputes. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the U.S. Patent
Law: Antecedents (Part 5, II), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 665 (1996)
(providing an in-depth analysis of the steamboat patent priority dispute and its likely
effect on the Framers). Although the provision was omitted from the nation’s very first
patent act, it was included in the first revision of the patent act enacted three years later,
the Patent Act of 1793.
229
The first patent board included Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State. Federico
believed that Jefferson’s experiences, including his personal contact with patents,
convinced him that an inventor should be rewarded with a limited monopoly. Pasquale J.
Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 237, 240-41
(1936). “Certainly an inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his invention
for some certain time . . . Nobody wishes more than I do that ingenuity should receive
liberal encouragement.” Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State,
to Oliver Evans (May 1807), in V WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75, at 75-76
(Washington ed., 1807)).
230
Id. at 248.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 248-49. On August 26, 1791, the patent board awarded 14 total patents to the
four applicants. Id.
234
Id. at 249. “The titles of the patents as subsequently reported do not suggest duplicate
patents.” Id. The proceedings were notable for the arguments made by Fitch, who cited
the Statute of Monopolies to contend that he deserved the patent as the “first and true
inventor.” The English understanding of first and true inventor was not discussed, and
the Pennsylvania legislature applied the language literally to find that Fitch should
receive the patent. Rumsey had earlier obtained a patent for a “streamboat” in
Pennsylvania and Virginia. Fitch used his Pennsylvania patent to oppose Rumsey
successfully in Virginia, convincing Virginia that Rumsey’s patent covered a different
invention, but Rumsey prevailed and received a patent in Maryland. Fitch also obtained

42

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 1

[67] The precedent established by the English Statute of Monopolies
undeniably guided the framers. Remember, the English Statute of
Monopolies awarded the “first and true inventor” with a patent monopoly
for those inventions that provided benefit to the public. Although the
Intellectual Property Clause does not contain the words “first and true
inventor,” the Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793 do. Over forty years later, the
Patent Act of 1836 also utilized the phrases “original and true inventor”
and “original and first inventor.”235 Likewise, the Patent Act of 1952 used
the term “inventor” and required that the applicant sign an oath averring
that the applicant is “the original and first inventor.”236 The American
patent system, as envisioned by the framers and codified by the early
Congresses, has always awarded the patent to the first and true and
original inventor.
ii. Judicial Interpretation of the Constitutional and Statutory Language
[68] Chief Justice John Marshall provided numerous insights into
constitutional interpretation. In Marbury v. Madison, the Chief Justice
noted, “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is
intended to be without effect . . . .”237 He explained:
As men, whose intentions require no concealment,
generally employ the words which most directly and aptly
express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened
patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who
adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in

patents in New Jersey, Delaware, and New York. In Pennsylvania, Rumsey and Fitch
battled again, but somehow the issue mutated into whether Fitch had a right to “improve”
Rumsey’s design. The Pennsylvania legislature left both patents intact. According to
Walterscheid, these state patent battles offer two lessons. [First,] the states were
predisposed to award the patent to the “first inventor[.]” Second, once a patent was
issued they were inclined to let it stand, even if it had been issued in error. Carnathan,
supra note 71, at 773-74 (recounting the patent priority dispute between Fitch and
competitor Arthur Donaldson) (alteration in original).
235
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 6-8, 15, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
236
Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1952).
237
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).
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their natural sense, and to have intended what they have
said.238
The Chief Justice believed that when the framers’ language was not
doubtful, their “plain and obvious intent must prevail.”239
[69] A century later, in United States v. Meyer, Chief Justice Taft echoed
Marshall’s sentiments.240 Although the Intellectual Property Clause was
not at issue, Taft’s message was clear. The first few federal congresses
were comprised of “a considerable number of those who had been
members of the convention that framed the Constitution and presented it
for ratification.”241 Following the Constitutional Convention, nearly half
the men who signed the Constitution later served in the First Federal
Congress.242 This was the Congress that “launched the government.”243
More importantly, “[i]t was a Congress whose constitutional decisions
have always been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of the greatest
weight in the interpretation of that fundamental instrument.”244 As such,
the Supreme Court has endorsed the “principle that a contemporaneous
legislative exposition of the Constitution, when the founders of our
government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in
public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction
to be given its provisions.”245
[70] Such deference to the actions and legislation of these early
Congresses prompted author Edwin Suominen to ask, “[c]an there thus be
any doubt about the ‘construction placed upon the constitution’ by the

238

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 188 (1824).
Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4564).
240
United States v. Myers, 272 U.S. 52, 174 (1926).
241
Id.
242
See Historical Documents,
http://www.historicaldocuments.com/FoundingFathers.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). Of
the fifty-five delegates, nineteen later served as Senators and thirteen served as
Representatives. Id.
243
Myers, 272 U.S. at 174.
244
Id. at 174-75.
245
Id. at 175.
239
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‘men who were contemporary with its formation’ in the Patent Acts of
1790 and 1793?”246
[71] The Court has often recognized that the Intellectual Property Clause
limits Congress’s power to modify the patent monopoly. Congress “may
not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.
Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation,
advancement or social benefit gained thereby . . . This is the standard
expressed in the constitution and may not be ignored.”247 The adoption of
the first-to-file system enlarges the patent monopoly because this system is
inconsistent with the intent of the framers and the early Congresses.
[72] Chief Justice Marshall believed the Constitution and the statutory
law gave an exclusive inchoate property right to the inventor “from the
moment of invention.”248 Furthermore, this right could not be “invaded or
impaired” by anyone nor used “without the consent of the inventor.”249
According to Marshall, the legislature knew that these exclusive rights
“vested in the inventor, from the moment of discovery” and were “only
perfected by the patent . . . .”250 Marshall continued, “[w]ere it otherwise,
246

Edwin Suominen, Re-Discovering Article 1, Section 8 – The Formula for First-toInvent, 83 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 641, 646 (2001).
247
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (citing Great A. & P.
Tea Co. v. Supermkt. Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)).
248
Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4564).
249
Id. Marshall revisited the Intellectual Property Clause in a subsequent decision and
explained:
The securing to inventors of an exclusive right to their inventions, was
deemed of so much importance, as a means of promoting the progress
of science and the useful arts, that the constitution has expressly
delegated to Congress the power to secure such rights to them for a
limited period. The inventor has, during this period, a property in his
inventions; a property which is often of very great value, and of which
the law intended to give him the absolute enjoyment and possession.
Ex Parte Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. 603, 608 (1824) (emphasis added).
250
Evans, 8 F.Cas at 874. See also A.F. & Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556, 562 (1977)
(explaining that,
The Constitution speaks of securing to inventors the exclusive right to
their discoveries, not that the inventor must apply. Thus, the
Constitution is result-oriented and contemplates that the grant of the
patent be to the inventor, either directly or through his assignee . . . . the
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the exclusive right in the discovery which the constitution authorizes
congress to secure to the inventor, and the exclusive right to use it after the
date of the patent, which the act of congress confers, would not be
exclusive . . . .”251 The adoption of the first-to-file system ignores these
teachings and authorizes a practice that has no constitutional, statutory, or
historical basis.
iii. The Judiciary’s Consideration of Foreign Authorities
[73] The adoption of the first-to-file system may also contaminate the
American judiciary by endorsing the use of foreign authority in the
interpretation of the United States Constitution. The use of foreign
authorities in American jurisprudence recently soared to new heights.252
Writing for the majority in Lawrence v. Texas, Supreme Court Justice
Kennedy relied on a case from the European Court of Human Rights to
overrule the Court’s seventeen-year-old decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.
253
“To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers
have been rejected elsewhere.”254 According to the Court, the issue in
constitutional objective of granting a patent (or a reissue patent) to the
true inventor . . . .).
251
Evans, 8 F.Cas at 873.
252
In Knight v. Florida, the defendant-petitioner was first sentenced to death in April
1975. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999). After a series of hearings and appeals, the
appellate court ordered a new sentencing proceeding. In February 1996, defendantpetitioner was again sentenced to death. Because he had been sentenced to death
approximately twenty-five years earlier, defendant-petitioner sought certiorari from the
Supreme Court to review the delay of execution. In his dissent from the denial of
certiorari, Justice Breyer wrote,
A growing number of courts outside the United States-courts that
accept or assume the lawfulness of the death penalty-have held that
lengthy delay in administering a lawful death penalty renders ultimate
execution inhuman, degrading, or unusually cruel . . . this Court has
long considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign
courts have applied standards roughly comparable to our own
constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances.
Id. at 995, 997 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
253
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003). See generally Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981).
254
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added) (Kennedy, J.) (noting that the European
Court of Human Rights had not followed Bowers).

46

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 1

Lawrence was one that had been “accepted as an integral part of human
freedom in many other countries.”255 Recognizing a right of privacy for
adults engaged in homosexual sodomy in the United States, Justice
Kennedy wrote that “other nations . . . have taken action consistent with
an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in
intimate, consensual conduct.”256
[74]
Although the American judiciary’s consideration of foreign
authorities is not novel, it is highly controversial. Since much of
American law has its roots in English practices, the American judiciary
has historically turned to English jurisprudence for insight. However, the
growing reliance on an increasingly diverse body of foreign authorities is
troublesome. Justice Scalia, for example, rebuked the majority in his
Lawrence dissent. “The Court’s discussion of these foreign views . . . is . .
. meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court . . .
should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’”257 In
an earlier decision, Justice Scalia argued that the practices of the world
community were irrelevant.258 “[W]here there is not first a settled
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however
enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be
imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.”259
[75] The debate continues outside chambers as well. Current Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens as well as former Justice O’Connor
believe that foreign authorities are relevant to constitutional

255

Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
257
Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002)).
258
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting), cert. granted.
In Atkins, the defendant-appellant was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to
death. At trial, he was described as “mildly mentally retarded.” The Virginia Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Certiorari was granted. In a 6-3 decision,
the Supreme Court held that executions of mentally retarded criminals constituted a
“cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id.
259
Id. Scalia’s scathing rebuke persisted, “[b]ut the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble
Effort to fabricate national consensus must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a
footnote) to the views of assorted professional and religious organizations, members of
the so-called world community, and respondents to opinion polls.” Id. at 347.
256
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interpretation.260 More important, these justices have incorporated foreign
authorities into their opinions.261 Conversely, current Justices Scalia and
Thomas have spoken against such a practice262 consistently rejecting the
260

See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International
Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 282 (1999) (“Comparative analysis
emphatically is relevant to . . . interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights.”);
Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Keynote Address
Before the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law: The Supreme Court and the New International Law (Apr. 4, 2003) (explaining why
“foreign experience is often important to our work.”), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-04-03.html; Sandra Day
O’Connor, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Keynote Address Before
the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 348
(March 15, 2002). In her speech, Justice O’Connor asked, “[w]hy does information about
international law matter so much? Why should judges and lawyers . . . care about issues
of foreign law and international law? The reason, of course, is globalization. No
institution of government can afford now to ignore the rest of the world.” Id. at 349. She
also noted that, “conclusions reached by other countries and by the international
community should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts.” Id. at
350.
261
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(citing the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13);
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (Kennedy, J.); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (Stevens, J.) (noting
foreign countries’ disapproval of imposing death penalty on the mentally retarded);
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that
“[w]illingness to consider foreign judicial views in comparable cases is not surprising in
a Nation that from its birth has given a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.”);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that
foreign material “may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of
different solutions to a common legal problem . . . .”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 785-87 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
262
Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Keynote Address
Before the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law:
Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts 305 (Apr. 2, 2004). During his speech,
Justice Scalia spoke mostly against using foreign authorities in constitutional cases,
except for old English authorities relevant to the Framers’ intent. He acknowledged,
however, that foreign authorities might be relevant in statutory cases where the statute
implements a treaty or otherwise “directly or indirectly refer[s] to foreign law.” Id. at
305. Like Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas appears to be mostly opposed to foreign law
sources in constitutional cases, but has used them at least once for comparison. Compare
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suggestion that the beliefs and practices of the international community
should be used to “buttress our commitment to American principles.”263
Justice Scalia, again dissenting, wrote:
It is of course true that we share a common history with the
United Kingdom, and that we often consult English sources
when asked to discern the meaning of a constitutional text
written against the backdrop of the 18th-century English
law and legal thought . . . [But it] is beyond comprehension
why we should look to find our current standards of
decency] . . . to a country that has developed, in the
centuries since the Revolutionary War – and with
increasing speed since the United Kingdom’s recent
submission to the jurisprudence of European courts
dominated by continental jurists – a legal, political, and
social culture quite different than our own.264
These opinions demonstrate that the Supreme Court is divided. Because
the relevance, importance, and most notably, the appropriateness of using
foreign authorities to guide American jurisprudence is undecided, the
Court struggles to find balance in its own jurisprudential applications.
Intellectual property law is no exception to the judiciary’s internal battle.
If the first-to-file system is adopted, then American courts will inevitably
turn to the laws, practices, and preferences of foreign countries in deciding
patent priority issues.
[76] In the absence of an overarching analytical framework,265 American
courts have substantial discretion in choosing when, why, which, where,
and how foreign authorities are considered in the resolution of domestic
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that “this
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans.”), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965)
(stating the court’s duty is to “decide cases ‘agreeably to the Constitution and the laws of
the United States.’”), with Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 906 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (comparing the voting systems of foreign countries to the United States
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intellectual property disputes.266 As the number of multi-national
intellectual property disputes rises, the likelihood increases that a conflict
arising under the laws of one country will arise under the laws of other
countries. 267 The pressure to provide uniformity will intensify.
[77] The Supreme Court recently demonstrated its tremendous discretion
in deciding whether to incorporate foreign authorities into its analysis of
two different intellectual property issues. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court
reasoned that the European Union’s extension of copyright terms
supported its own conclusion that the United States’ extension of
copyright had a justifiable basis – that is, harmonization.268 However, in
the same term and without discussion, the Court rejected an argument that
European concepts of moral rights should inform the Court’s
interpretation of the Lanham Act.269
[78] These two contemporaneous decisions illustrate that utilizing foreign
authority to interpret the Constitution and statutory law is unpredictable.
As American courts are called upon with increasing frequency to
determine the relevance of foreign law in domestic disputes, the lack of a
bona fide infrastructure will only muddy the waters. The courts will have
to undertake the additional burden and expense270 in assessing how
individual foreign jurisdictions differ from the United States in terms of
their respective systems of law, governance, culture, politics, and
economic standing.271 Without a structured framework guiding such an
analysis, the American judiciary will likely cite foreign authority when it
supports a favored conclusion and ignore it when it does not.272
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iv. Congress Attempts to Stem the Tide
[79] Congress has also recognized the judiciary’s increasing reliance on
foreign authority to guide constitutional interpretation and resolution of
other domestic disputes. To curb this practice, on March 17, 2004,
Representative Tom Feeney (R-FL) introduced House Resolution 568 into
the 108th Congress.273
Representative Feeney explained that the
“American people have not authorized through Congress or through a
constitutional amendment the use of foreign laws to establish new law or
deny rights here in the United States.”274 Co-Sponsor Bob Goodlatte (RVA) had this explanation to offer:
Recently there has been a deeply disturbing trend in
American juris-prudence. The Supreme Court, the highest
court in the land, has begun to look abroad, to international
law instead of our own Constitution as the basis for its
decisions. In fact six of the Court’s nine justices have
either written or joined opinions that cite foreign
authorities. This is an affront to both our national
sovereignty and the broader democratic underpinnings of
our system of government. The introduction of this
legislation comes at a critical time, for when judges and
justices begin to operate outside the boundaries of the U.S.
Constitution, Congress must respond.275
House Resolution 568 declared that “judicial determinations regarding the
meaning of the laws of the United States should not be based on
judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such
foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of
the original meaning of the laws of the United States.”276
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[80] On February 15, 2005, Feeney re-introduced into the 109th Congress
the identical resolution as House Resolution 97.277 One month later,
Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) introduced to the Senate the identical bill.278
All three of these resolutions recognized that “[the] inappropriate judicial
reliance on foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements threatens the
sovereignty of the United States, the separation of powers and the
President's and the Senate's treaty-making authority . . . .”279
[81] Other members of Congress have also attempted to curb the
judiciary’s reliance on foreign authority. In the 108th Congress,
Representatives Robert Aderholt (R-AL) and Mike Pence (R-IN), along
with thirty-seven co-sponsors, introduced House Report 3799 entitled the
“Constitution Restoration Act of 2004.”280 Senator Richard Shelby (DAL) introduced the same bill to the Senate.281 Title II, Section 201 of both
bills stated:
In interpreting and applying the Constitution of the United
States, a court of the United States may not rely upon any
constitution, law, administrative rule, Executive order,
directive, policy, judicial decision, or any other action of
any foreign state or international organization or agency,
other than the constitutional law and English common
law.282
Unfortunately, neither an analytical framework nor a sustained dialogue
regarding these important issues has been established. These recent
congressional attempts to mandate the judiciary’s strict adherence to
American jurisprudence during its interpretation of the Constitution and
277
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application of statutory law failed. When the legislative term ended, each
was eliminated from further congressional consideration.
v. Maintaining the Separation of Powers
[82] Lastly, the framers explicitly balanced the distribution of power
between the three branches of government. When one branch oversteps
the limits of its constitutional duties, the separation of powers is blurred.
The actions of the greedy branch force another branch to cede some of its
enumerated powers. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled, any
misuse of power, regardless of the magnitude of the infraction, must be
voided immediately. The idea behind a written constitution is that it forms
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. Over two centuries ago,
Chief Justice Marshall explained “. . . there is no middle ground. The
constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts,
is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.”283 Any imbalance
poses a threat to the very fiber of America’s constitutional republic.
[83] If the American judiciary interjects elements of foreign authorities
into its decision making process without congressional guidance, then it
risks overstepping the boundaries of its authority. If Congress wants the
judiciary to incorporate foreign authorities into its analysis of domestic
issues, then it can establish a framework in which that analysis can
proceed. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall declared, “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.”284 The law to which he refers is undoubtedly the law of this
country. The American judiciary is equipped to determine the meaning of
American law. The same cannot be said of foreign law. Until that time,
the use of foreign authorities by the American judiciary to interpret
American laws created by the American Congress is far too un-American
a thought to entertain.
[84] The text of the Constitution must always be the starting part for any
analysis regarding its interpretation and application. Although foreign
authority may provide the judiciary with a fresh perspective, adherence to
283
284
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both American statutory law and common law is indispensable. While the
framers may have relied on English law to guide them, it was a pragmatic
decision in light of the enormous task of drafting the document that
birthed this nation. Now, over two hundred years later, the United States
is a strong and thriving world leader with volumes of judicial precedent,
particularly relating to intellectual property law. The judiciary need not
rely on foreign authorities in either its constitutional or statutory
interpretation, particularly if such reliance is utilized solely to pursue
international harmonization of intellectual property laws.
[85] Adoption of the first-to-file system will disregard centuries of
intellectual property jurisprudence and force the judiciary to incorporate
the only available source of precedent – that of foreign countries. This
weakens the Constitution and threatens American interests. If the United
States is going to harmonize its intellectual property laws with those of
other nations, then it must be the work of Congress and not the judiciary.
PART VII. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
[86] There is no shortage of proposals for patent reform. These potential
reforms are broad in scope and extensive in nature. However, as described
in the beginning of this article, if changes need to be made, then the coach
of Team Patent must make the changes in a way that minimizes disruption
to the team. Following any changes in the lineup, an individual player
must still be comfortable in the role he has been assigned. Remember, the
potential for success is optimized when the greatest number of players is
comfortable.
A. Experiment with Reform Within the First-to-Invent Framework
[87] If the cost of determining inventorship through an interference
proceeding is truly too costly to the parties and to the PTO, then the
answer does not exist in the first-to-file system. Modifying rather than
abandoning the current system will be much less disruptive to patent
prosecution than the introduction of an entirely new system. Rather,
alternative means for resolving priorities disputes can be integrated into
the current first-to-invent system. Likewise, there are several aspects of
the current patent process that can be tweaked slowly and steadily. This
type of reform is less unsettling to the patent community because it allows
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the team to acclimate to the new rules with little disruption and at a less
frenzied pace. Many aspects of the patent process could benefit from a
more bite-size approach to reform.
[88] Currently, when the application is rejected due to lack of novelty or
when the application is challenged during an interference, the PTO
presumes that the date of invention is the application’s filing date.
Therefore, an applicant is only required to show an earlier conception
date. Rather than this wait-and-see approach towards priority, the PTO
could require applicants to be more proactive in establishing their
invention dates. For example, the PTO could require applicants to submit
corroborating proof which establishes the date of conception at the time of
filing. If an applicant were unable to provide tangible corroboration of an
earlier invention date, then the PTO would unequivocally establish the
application’s filing date as its invention date. As soon as the applicant’s
invention date is determined, another party may come forward and offer
evidence of an earlier invention date. So long as the evidence could be
corroborated, the second party will win the priority dispute.
[89] Similarly, the PTO could also require that inventors maintain more
comprehensive records. A rule promulgated by the PTO would uniformly
give notice to all practitioners, businesses, and inventors, and would
encourage the contemporaneous acquisition of evidence corroborating
conception, reduction to practice, and diligence. Even if inventors are
forced to be more meticulous in keeping the necessary records to
corroborate these inventive acts, any additional burden associated with
these endeavors is well worth the avoidance of a traditional interference
proceeding. It is far easier to invest a little more time and effort in record
keeping during the development of the invention than it is to reconstruct
events, thoughts, impressions, and actions that occurred weeks, months,
and perhaps years, earlier.
[90] Although these particular options are unlikely to be embraced, they
are offered here solely to demonstrate that options other than the blind
adoption of the first-to-file system are available.
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B. Cultivate the Judiciary’s Expertise
[91] During the 109th Congress, Representatives Darrell Issa (R-CA) and
Adam Schiff (D-CA) proposed an intriguing change to the patent process
when they introduced House Report 5418.285 The bill establishes “a pilot
program in certain United States district courts to encourage enhancement
of expertise in patent cases among district judges.”286 According to Issa,
the legislation is designed to help courts reduce the errors that lead to
appeals.287 One week after the House passed House Report 5418, Senators
Orin Hatch (R-UT) and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) introduced an identical
bill to the Senate.288
[92] Through the established pilot programs, judges in at least five district
courts would have the choice to opt into hearing patent cases.289 Each of
the test courts would be assigned a clerk with expertise in patent law or the
technical issues arising in patent cases.290 Furthermore, those judges who
opt into the program would receive funding for related educational
opportunities.291 When a patent case is randomly assigned to a judge who
has joined the program, that judge would keep the case.292 If a patent case
is randomly assigned to a judge who has not joined the program, then that
judge would have the choice of keeping the case or referring it to the

285
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group of judges who have opted-in to the program.293 The proposed pilot
program would last no longer than ten years and periodic studies would
determine the project’s success.294
[93] What would motivate the proposal of such a pilot project? “Patent
cases are complex, difficult, time consuming and expensive. Despite the
nature of these cases, they are litigated before generalist judges and lay
juries.”295 Representative Issa noted that the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals reverses roughly 40% of all patent case appeals.296 This high
reversal rate of district court decisions in patent cases “undermines
confidence in district court decision-making and the integrity of [the] legal
system.”297 Issa remarked that “[p]rior to coming to Congress, I was part
of a number of patent suits. I was often struck by the fact that many
district court judges either knew little of the applicable law, or did not
understand the technology involved.”298 This legislation, according to
Representative Schiff, would “raise the level of expertise in patent
litigation [and] improve the reliability of patents . . . .”299 On January 4,
2007, Representatives Issa, Schiff, and Cohen (D-TN) reintroduced the
bill as House Report 34 in the current 110th Congress.300 On February 12,
2007, the House of Representatives passed House Report 34 by a voice
vote.301
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[94] In many ways, the Eastern District of Texas is a microcosm of the
system proposed by Issa’s bill. The numbers speak for themselves. Of the
approximately 2700 patent cases filed annually, almost 10% of these cases
are filed in the Eastern District of Texas. Furthermore, over half of those
cases are filed in small town of Marshall. While patent cases normally
take three to five years to be resolved elsewhere, they are typically
resolved in about fourteen to eighteen months in Marshall.302 More
remarkable is the fact that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has never
reversed a decision by Marshall Judges Ward and Davis.303
[95] What makes Marshall unique? First, Marshall’s judges have a
background in trial practice in the Eastern District, a district where cases
historically move quickly.304 Second, the Eastern District has a reputation
as a good place to try cases because the courts “provided a firm trial
setting, simplified and expedited discovery procedures, and judges who
actively control their docket.”305 Third, Marshall implemented a set of
local patent rules. Introduced by Judge Ward in 1999, these patent rules
advance cases through the initial stages of litigation, particularly the
tedious claims construction portion of a patent case.306
[96] Marshall’s lesson is clear. A dedicated, experienced, and
knowledgeable court is part of the patent solution.
C. Boost the PTO’s Budget
[97] The current American patent system appears to be improving. The
PTO, which for years has been under-funded, reported that FY 2006 was a
record year in many respects. First, FY 2006 represented only the second
year in a row where the PTO had full use of its fee collections.307
According to the PTO’s Performance and Accountability Report for FY
2006, this infusion of funds “allowed the USPTO continued flexibility
302
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towards meeting the goals . . . including . . . improving the quality of its
services and products . . . [and] enabl[ing] the USPTO to substantially
increase the number of examiners.”308 Second, recent increases in the
number of examiners are providing positive results. In FY 2006, patent
examiners completed over 332,000 patent applications - the largest
number ever - while concomitantly achieving the lowest patent allowance
error rate in over twenty years (3.5%).309 Third, at 54%, the patent
allowance rate was also the lowest on record.310
[98] Furthermore, on February 5, 2007, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property Steve Pinkos announced that President
Bush’s FY 2008 budget request for the PTO was 1.916 billion dollars.311
This marks the fourth consecutive year that the President’s budget
recommended that the PTO have full access to its anticipated fee
collections.312 According to Pinkos, the budget request allows the PTO to
“build on its recent successes in improving quality and increasing the
number of patent and trademark examinations . . . [and] provides the
resources to continue our record hiring of patent examiners . . . .”313 The
PTO anticipates hiring an additional 1200 examiners in FY 2008.314 This
is promising because the strength of issued patents turns on the efficiency
of the patent process,315 and the efficiency of the patent process depends
on a greater number of qualified examiners.
[99] Perhaps with a little more time and money, a major impetus behind
widespread patent reform, the poor quality of patents, will correct itself.
As Professor Jaffe explained, “[t]o put it crudely, if the patent office
allows bad patents to issue, this encourages people with bad applications
308

Id.
Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Top News: Deputy Under
Secretary of Commerce Announces FY 2008 Budge Proposal for USPTO (Feb. 5, 2007),
available at www.uspto.gov.
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
However, the PTO has only had full access for two of the three years. Id.
313
Id.
314
Id.
315
Paul Edward Geller, An International Patent Utopia, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 589 (2003).
309

59

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 1

to show up . . . Conversely, if the PTO pretty consistently rejected
applications for bad patents, people would understand that bad
applications are a waste of time and money.”316 With the lowest patent
allowance rate on record and the lowest patent allowance error rate in two
decades, as well as a pledge to hire an additional 1200 examiners this year
alone, the PTO is serious about patent quality.
D. Change the PTO’s Perspective on Examiner Compensation
[100] Old problems sometimes need fresh solutions. During her
testimony before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Christine Siwik suggested that any reform effort should be directed at the
PTO before introducing any major changes to the patent act.317 Siwik
suggested that the current system for compensating patent examiners is
counterproductive because it “rewards those who issue a large number of
patents and punishes examiners who do not meet their production
goals.”318 Siwik described the pressure on examiners to meet their count
quotas as “substantial and constant.”319 Because it is a dangerous practice
316
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result in an examiner being placed on probation, which can lead to the
examiner losing his or her job. As a result, it is critically important for
examiners to meet their count quotas. The PTO compensation system
thus encourages examiners to allow patents in order to receive
increased performance bonuses and to avoid penalization, irrespective
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to encourage examiners to issue patents to secure bonuses, she urged that a
“focus on the quality, and not the quantity, of patents issued.”320
E. Keep the Team’s Expectations Realistic
[101] It is also imperative to remember that a patent system so large and
powerful is going to require constant supervision and maintenance. As
scholar Adam Jaffe explained, “[p]atent examination is never going to be
perfect. Examiners are human. More important, there is an essentially
irreducible aspect of judgment in determining if an invention is truly
new.”321 Because the patent system can never be perfect, the focus of any
reform should not be the adoption of the first-to-file system, but rather on
the development of “a system that functions reasonably well despite the
issuance of some bad patents.”322
PART VIII. CONCLUSION
[102] The adoption of a first-to-file patent system will cause irreparable
harm to American innovation. Despite its flaws, the current first-to-invent
system is the one envisioned by the framers and enacted by the early
Congresses. The changes proposed by the first-to-file system would
unravel over two hundred years of established jurisprudence, and would
directly oppose the constitutional mandate of promoting the progress of
the useful arts and sciences through awarding the patent to the first
inventor. The motivation to abandon the first-to-invent system stems from
the perceived benefit of harmonizing international patent laws. However,
the adoption of the first-to-file system should only proceed if it is in the
country’s best interest. This paper demonstrates that it is not. As one
author noted, “[i]t makes no sense to eliminate an entire system in favor of
a first-to-file system which ultimately costs everyone more and produces
of the quality of those patents…changing the system in a way that
eliminates any incentive to issue questionable patents.
Id.
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worst patents, just because a first-to-file system is conceptually and
bureaucratically a simple one.”323
[103] If global patent harmonization is inevitable, then the American
government cannot jeopardize its superior position at the negotiation table.
The American first-to-invent system provides the most powerful and
desirable protection for intellectual property.324 That fierce sense of
protection is born from the fact that inventorship and ownership are
inextricably intertwined in this system. The American system focuses on
protecting the individual patentee by providing that patentee with the
exclusive property rights to the invention. The same cannot be said of
some first-to-file systems such as Japan’s, where the patent system
encourages the dissemination of technology in an effort to promote
industrial development.325 Hence, adoption of the first-to-file system
would remove inventorship from the innovation equation and align the
American patent system with the weaker and less desirable patent systems
of Japan and the European Patent Office.
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Katona writes:
In consultations with many foreign patent professional[s] after
explaining to them the problems that the introduction of the first-to-file
system could raise in the United States, it was gratifying to see that
they have overwhelmingly spoken in favor of retaining the first-toinvent system here, provided that 35 U.S.C. 104 is eliminated . . . and
In re Hilmer does not remain the law . . . [i]n fact, many foreign
professionals were anxious to have their first-to-file systems changed to
an inherently more fair first-to-invent system.
Id. at 403 (emphasis in original).
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[104] The first-to-file system would foster a decrease in the quality of
patents, an increase in the volume and costs of patent litigation, and would
cause utter confusion as inventors, businesses, practitioners, the PTO, and
the courts struggled to conform to the new system. One only needs to
envision the ensuing chaos if the United States implemented the “absolute
novelty” provision associated with the first-to-file system, or the logistical
nightmare of implementing prior users’ rights, and then administering
those rights. It is true that interference proceedings are expensive,
laborious, and potentially risky undertakings.326 In the context of a
priority dispute, however, they are inherently fairer. 327
[105] Because conception is the touchstone of inventorship, the first-toinvent system provides Americans with something that has always
distinguished this country from others - HOPE. The proverbial “American
Dream” is premised on opportunity, the opportunity to capitalize on one’s
ingenuity, perseverance, and inspiration. The first-to-invent system of
awarding patent priority preserves that dream for American inventors. The
system equalizes the playing field for those innovators who have large
dreams but small pocketbooks. If reform is imminent, then the first-to-file
system should be the very last substitution made. Since the first patent act
was enacted, this nation has experienced great success under the first-toinvent system. As Chief Justice Roberts recently remarked, “a page of
history is worth a volume of logic.”328 Simply stated, the abandonment of
the first-to-invent patent system is not in this team’s best interest.
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